Annual Report

July 14th, 2008 by sonnytrillanes4

ANNUAL REPORT

I. MESSAGE

Inside a jail cell, you are not witness to the state of the country with your own eyes: the rising cost of living in unequal proportion with a failing economic order. You are unable to hear the sentiments of our people first-hand: pervasive cries for justice and accountability against perpetrators of political violence and corruption. You appear insulated from what others endure outside these walls: the disillusionment of a people in the government that blatantly betrays its own obligation to serve them.

But out of duty and desire, I refuse not to see, listen and feel. Transcending the challenge of circumstance, I answer to your collective call to action as duly elected Senator of this country.

I have sought legislation on the Special Poverty Alleviation Fund, the creation of the Mindanao Development Authority, a P125 daily across-the-board salary increase and the security of tenure of private sector employees, post-harvest facilities to rice farmers, the democratization of public school education, among other bills to protect and empower those who are forced further into society’s fringes.

I have filed resolutions on the investigation of the ‘Spratly Deal’ purportedly entered into by the Arroyo administration with China resulting in overpriced loans for anomalous transactions such as the ZTE-NBN deal, the North Rail and South Rail projects and the Department of Education’s Cyber-Ed project, the alleged involvement of ranking State officials in the Glorietta 2 bombing as well as in the ambush and mutilation by extremist groups of members of the Philippine Marine Corps and their criminal culpability, the status of peace agreements with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Moro National Liberation Front, the assassination of environmentalist and Romblon councilor Armin Marin, with other fiscal procedures in pursuit of social justice and peace.

I am as much an advocate as public official, joining the lone voices in the likes of Jun Lozada that rally against the Arroyo regime, reinforced with tangible measures that ensure the collective fight for our fragile democracy is won. These include bills on qualifying salvaging or extrajudicial killing as a heinous crime, the imposition of stiffer penalties against government employees engaged in unfair and unethical lobbying practices, as well as in the refusal and neglect of prompt action on the public’s personal transactions and communications, and a reward to informers in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.

In addressing national issues of urgent interest, I have filed a bill on defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines.

In my conviction that our government must no longer make criminals out of good citizens, I have actively pushed for the protection of human rights, through proposed laws on uniform requirements and procedures for making arrests, and regulating the installation and maintenance of checkpoints.

There is no greater oppression than poverty. Adherence to this belief has led to my authorship of bills on repealing Republic Act 9337, otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax law, and amending Presidential Decree 1177 or the Automatic Appropriations law, for the non-prioritization of debt servicing in budget allocation to augment the Internal Revenue Allotments of local government units.

For the immediate alleviation of those in dire economic straits, food distribution programs initiated in urban poor areas of Caloocan, Manila, Quezon City, Malabon, and Mandaluyong are ongoing and operational.

But there should neither be contentment nor congratulations in these modest gains. Only the unrelenting challenge to break free from whatever confines our own service and advocacy to a nation that badly needs us now more than ever.

II. INTRODUCTION

In 2004, more than 11 million Filipinos elected Antonio F. Trillanes—while incarcerated at the Marine Brig inside Fort Bonifacio and without traditional reliance on political machinery—to the Philippine Senate. More than one man’s vindication from the Arroyo administration’s prolonged censure of change, it embodied the entire nation’s enduring defiance against corruption and ill governance.

Senator Trillanes has reciprocated the people’s trust with steadfast service in legislation .. areas in economic recovery and social reform.

III. LIST OF BILLS

AGRICULTURE

SBN 2094. An Act to promote and develop the Philippine Mango Industry, creating for this purpose the Philippine Mango Industry Development Board, appropriating funds therefor, and for other purposes

SBN 2183. An Act to stabilize the sugar industry by establishing the Sugar Industry Research and Stabilization Fund and for other purposes

SBN 2085. An Act creating the Philippine Halal Accreditation and Regulatory Board and for other purposes

SBN 2058. An Act providing post-harvest facilities to rice farmers

SBN 2038. An Act creating a Coffee Research, Development and Extension Center, authorizing the appropriation of funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 2037. An Act institutionalizing the young farmers program, providing funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 2211. An Act requiring coastal provinces, coastal cities and first class coastal municipalities to have a marine reserve for aquatic resources and fisheries officer to supervise the same and appropriating funds therefor

BANKING AND FINANCE

SBN 1593. An Act including government officials and employees in the exceptions from the prohibition against disclosure of or inquiry into deposits with any banking institution amending for this purpose certain provision of RA 1405 otherwise known as the “Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law”, and for other purposes

SBN 2123. An Act limiting the period of amortization of loans contracted by local government to the term of office of the local executives concerned, and for other purposes

CIVIL SERVICE

SBN 1792. An Act adopting an Omnibus Job Classification and Compensation Standardization System in the Civil Service, appropriating funds therefor, providing penal sanctions for violations thereof, and for other purposes

SBN 2266. An Act declaring the Special Shari’a Bar Examination as Civil Service Examination amending for the purpose RA 1080 entitled “An Act declaring the Bar and Board Examinations as Civil Examinations”

SBN 1944. An Act creating the Department of Maritime Affairs providing funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 1791. An Act enabling retirees who have not received pensions either by choice or operation of law to receive pensions at age seventy years or over, and providing funds therefor

SBN 1790. An Act providing that all contractual and casual employees in the government service be paid their corresponding wages during special public holidays, and appropriating funds therefor

SBN 1789. An Act granting retirement incentive and health care benefit to professional Filipino athletes who have won world titles or world championships and providing funds therefor

SBN 1718. An Act granting Civil Service Professional Eligibility to all permanent employees, who have rendered 15 straight years of services by the year 2008

SBN 1717. An Act to develop entrepreneurship among government employees for an innovation-inspired corps of civil servants and a productive post-service citizenry

SBN 1707. An Act requiring all government offices to ensure the release of the retirement benefits of its employees within fifteen days from retirement

SBN 1706. An Act granting Civil Service Eligibility under certain conditions to a government employee whose status of appointment is casual or contractual and who has rendered a total of ten (10) years of efficient service

SBN 1705. An Act providing automatic promotion of government officials and employees upon retirement from government service and for other purposes

SBN 1704. An Act reducing the age requirement for applicants taking the board examination for social workers, providing for the continuing social work education and upgrading the sundry provisions relative to the practice of social work

SBN 1703. An Act redefining the Third Level positions in the Career Civil Service

SBN 2139. An Act providing for the registration, licensure and practice of food technology in the Philippines, providing funds therefore and for other purposes

SBN 2136. An Act regulating the registration, licensure and practice of occupational therapy, providing funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 2255. An Act granting night shift differential pay to the government employees including those in Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations and appropriating funds therefor

SBN 2254. An Act providing for a ceiling on all public debts of the Republic of the Philippines and for other purposes

SBN 2253. An Act providing for stiffer penalties against public officials and employees who refuse or neglect to act promptly on the public’s personal transactions and communications as required under RA 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees

SBN 2234. An Act establishing the National Land Transportation Authority, appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes

EDUCATION, PROFESSION AND CULTURE

SBN 2184. An Act providing penalties for schools, colleges and universities which refuse admission of qualified scholars of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office

SBN 2256. An Act creating plantilla position in the Department of Education for volunteer teachers with at least five years of continuous service in the public school system and appropriating funds therefor

SBN 2228. An Act establishing and providing for a free public pre-school education and for other purposes

SBN 2007. An Act recognizing National Scenic Byways in the Philippines thereby creating a national scenic byways program, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 1998. An Act providing for the democratization of public school education

SBN 1994. An Act to protect, conserve, promote and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations by exacting a performance fee from foreign performers and allocating the proceeds thereof to the National Commission on Culture and Arts, and for other purposes

SBN 1889. An Act providing for a Comprehensive Study-Now-Pay-Later Plan and appropriating funds therefore

SBN 132. An Act to strengthen the University of the Philippines as the National University

SBN 759. An Act requiring Mandatory Computer Education in all public and private high schools and for other related purposes

SBN 756. An Act increasing the minimum salary grade of public school teachers from salary Grade 10 to 20 and providing funds therefor

ELECTORAL REFORM

SBN 2057. An Act prohibiting an elective public official from resigning from his elective office to accept an appointment to any government office and providing penalties therefor

ENERGY

SBN 2267. An Act establishing Solar Energy Development Authority and appropriating funds therefor
ENVIRONMENT

SBN 2229. An Act creating the National Environmental Protection Agency, defining its powers, functions and responsibilities, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 2209. An Act proposing the creation of the Philippine Bamboo and Rattan Center (PBRC) to conserve, propagate and promote bamboo and rattan species

SBN 2088. An Act to strengthen the recycling program for all rechargeable batteries manufactured, sold and distributed in the Philippines, and for other purposes

SBN 1995. An Act increasing the penalty impose against polluters of navigable waters by amending Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 979 providing for the revision of Presidential Decree No. 600 governing marine pollution

SBN 2235. An Act regulating the practice of geology in the Philippines, repealing for the purpose Republic Act No. 4209, otherwise known as “Geology Profession Act of the Philippines” and for other purposes

FOREIGN RELATIONS

SBN 1467. An Act defining the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446

FISCAL REFORMS AND TAX MEASURES

SBN 2236. An Act providing for a cap on public debt to ensure long-term financial sustainability through fiscal discipline

SBN 1887. An act exempting savings deposits amounting to one hundred thousand pesos or less from withholding tax, amending Section 21 (c) (1) of the National Internal Revenue Code, thereby, and for other purposes

SBN 1448. An Act repealing Republic Act Numbered 9337, otherwise known as Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)

SBN 1888. An Act consolidating the laws granting rewards to informers of violations of Internal Revenue and Customs Laws, repealing for this purpose Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, Section 3513 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and for other purposes

SBN 1591. An Act amending Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, allocating fifty percent (50%) of the funds “freed” as a result of the amendment to augment the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) of Local Government Units, providing for the automatic release of the internal revenue allotments of Local Government Units and for other related purposes

HEALTH

SBN 2143. An Act providing for the practice of Rehabilitation Medicine and for other purposes

SBN 2142. An Act providing for the regulation and disposal of bio-medical wastes, declaring certain acts unlawful, prescribing penalties thereto, and for other purposes

SBN 1992. An Act providing that all citizens of the Philippines shall automatically be enrolled in the National Health Insurance Program amending for the purpose the National Health Insurance Act of 1995

SBN 1992. An Act providing that all citizens of the Philippines shall automatically be enrolled in the National Health Insurance Program amending for the purpose the National Health Insurance Act of 1995

SBN 1991. An Act authorizing government hospitals under the Department of Health (DOH) to retain and utilize all their income and interest derived from deposits, for maintenance and other operating expenses, capital outlays and for other purposes

SBN 1708. An Act institutionalizing the Philippine National Health Research System, establishing the Philippine National Health Research Fund providing for its administration and for other purposes

SBN 755. An Act prescribing special measures to lower the price of medicines and other related purposes

JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

SBN 2193. An Act qualifying salvaging or extrajudicial killing by any public officer, person in authority or agent of a person in authority as heinous crime, imposing the death penalty therefore and for other purposes

SBN 2124. An Act to provide uniform requirements and/or procedure for making arrest and for other purposes

SBN 1999. An Act amending Republic Act No. 6981 otherwise known as the “Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act” and for other purposes

SBN 760. An Act defining as a crime the act of driving any motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages and/or prohibited drugs and providing graduated penalties therefor

SBN 2237. An Act providing for a grant of reward to informers of violations of Republic Act No. 7080 and/or Republic Act No. 1379 and for other purposes

LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

SBN 2210. An Act mandating the establishment of a facility for non-school age children in private companies employing at least one hundred women workers and for other purposes

SBN 2186. An Act rationalizing the security of tenure of employees in the private sector, strengthening their rights, prohibiting contracting-out of work, and for other purposes

SBN 2084. An Act providing for the transfer in the Philippines of Science and Technology-related professions by overseas Filipino professionals, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 753. An Act providing for a P125.00 daily across-the-board increase in the salary rates of employees and workers in the private sector and for other related purposes

SBN 2227. An Act strengthening the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) amending for this purpose Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995″

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

SBN 2192. An Act providing for a twenty-year barangay development program, appropriating funds therefore and for other purposes

SBN 2138. An Act increasing the monthly emolument of barangay officials and for other purposes

SBN 2137. An Act granting retirement benefits to all elective or appointive barangay officials who have rendered a consecutive period of nine years or three terms of public service in the barangay, and appropriating funds therefor

SBN 2141. An Act authorizing the Local Sanggunians to declare special holidays in their respective localities to commemorate significant historic events and, to honor local heroes, providing guidelines therefor, and for other purposes

SBN 1993. An Act establishing the Local Management Information System
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY

SBN 2134. An Act amending Section 25 (d) of P.D. 1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military and Separation Decree of 1979 and for other purposes

SBN 2133. An Act fixing the retirement age for the officers and enlisted personnel of the AFP and members of the PNP to sixty-five

SBN 2086. An Act establishing the Emergency Management Agency (EMA) and providing funds therefor

SBN 1997. An Act regulating the installation and maintenance of checkpoints

SBN 1945. An Act amending Section 20 of Presidential Decree 1638, as amended by Presidential Decree 1650, otherwise known as the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement Law

SBN 1702. An Act amending sections one (1) and two (2) of Republic Act Numbered ninety-one eighty-eight (RA 9188), otherwise known as “An Act strengthening the professionalism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by increasing the percentage distribution be generals/flag officers in the AFP Table of Organizations”

SBN 1490. An Act providing for additional insurance coverage and benefits for all members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who are killed, wounded or injured in the line of duty, providing funds for the payment of the premiums and for other related purposes

SBN 1419. An Act transferring the Philippine Coast Guard to the Department of Transportation and Communications as a separate and distinct armed uniform commissioned service, further amending Republic Act No. 7153, as amended, and for other purposes

SBN 758. An Act prescribing fixed terms for the chief of staff and major service commanders of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for other purposes

SBN 754. An Act amending certain sections of the Republic Act No. 6948 otherwise known as “An Act standardizing and upgrading the benefits for military veterans and their dependents”
SBN 752. An Act requiring the concurrence of the Senate of the Philippines in any international agreement providing for the deployment abroad of Philippine military troops whether for peacekeeping missions or combat operations pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution

SBN 751. An act increasing the combat duty pay of all officers and enlisted personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from two hundred forty pesos (P240.00) per month to twenty-five per centum (25%) of their base pay and providing funds therefore
PUBLIC WELFARE AND SERVICES

SBN 2087. An Act providing for a Highway Safety Program in the Philippines, and for other purposes

SBN 2039. An Act promoting the physical, intellectual and social well-being of the Filipino youth through the establishment of a Comprehensive Youth Corps Program, appropriating funds therefor and for other purposes

SBN 2001. An Act prohibiting discrimination against persons on account of ethnic origin and/or religious belief

SBN 2265. An Act providing for the establishment of Drug Rehabilitation Center in every region of the country and appropriating funds therefore

SBN 2145. An Act to govern the introduction, promotion and development of the telecommunications-related converging technologies and services

SBN 2095. An Act strengthening the mandate on the Interconnection between and among Public Telecommunications entities, providing penalties for its violation and for other purposes

SBN 2004. An Act promulgating the uniform standards for bicycle helmets and promoting its use, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes

SBN 2059. An Act regulating harbor pilotage services and the conduct of harbor pilots in all ports in the Philippines and for other purposes

SBN 2000. An Act providing for the Modernization of Fire Protection and for other purposes

SBN 1996. An Act imposing stiffer penalties on pharmacies and drug stores which refuse to honor senior citizen card issued by the government

SBN 1425. An Act creating a Special Poverty Alleviation Fund to be used to finance school and community-based supplemental feeding programs and related poverty alleviation efforts using the Minimum Basic Needs (MBN) approach in the poorest of the poor communities in the country and for other related purposes

SBN 1716. An Act renaming Circumferential Road 5 or C-5 (from SLEX to Commonwealth Avenue) in Metro Manila in honor of President Emilio Aguinaldo, the president and commander-in-chief of the First Philippine Republic to be known as President Emilio Aguinaldo Avenue

SBN 1402. An Act to promote donations in good faith of medicines, food products or supplies by establishments and other entities, including individuals, by exempting them from any form of liability arising therefrom

SBN 757. An Act amending Republic Act No. 53, as amended, otherwise known as “An Act to exempt the publisher, editor or reporter of any publication from revealing the source of published news of information obtained in confidence” by including within its coverage journalists from broadcast, news agencies and internet publications

SBN 2002. An Act to accelerate the development of all barangays by providing funds for micro enterprises and for other purposes

TRADE AND COMMERCE

SBN 2194. An Act defining the offenses of hoarding, price manipulation and profiteering, declaring the same to be tantamount to economic sabotage, and providing penalties therefor

SBN 2135. An Act penalizing false or fraudulent advertising and for other purposes

URBAN PLANNING

SBN 1656. An Act regulating the practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, creating for the purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, appropriating funds therefor, and for other purposes

You may view the original Annual Report flyer here:

Front

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Corruption in the Philippine Navy Procurement System

January 20th, 2007 by sonnytrillanes4

 

 

 

Corruption in the Philippine Navy Procurement System

 

By:

 

LT ANTONIO F TRILLANES IV PN

March 2002

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 On
February 2001, the Philippine Navy (and the AFP) was rocked by a leadership
crisis when the Philippine Marines (PMAR) demanded the relief of the
Flag-Officer-In-Command, Rear Admiral Guillermo Wong (Pazzibugan, 2001). The
crisis was triggered by the berating of the Marines by RAdm Wong for alleged
irregularities in the procurement of P3.8 million worth of Kevlar Helmets
(Pablo, 2001). In the events that followed, the Marines prevailed and RAdm Wong
was stripped of his command and was “promoted” to an ambassadorial post. The
crisis, while it was eventually resolved peacefully, exposed a previously
unseen face of the Navy - the face of CORRUPTION.

 

BACKGROUND:
THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

 

The Philippine Navy (PN) is one of three
branches of service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Its mission
is ”to conduct prompt and sustained naval operations in support of the AFP’s
mission”. Among its functions are; to provide naval defense to ensure the
sovereignty of the Philippines and to protect the people from external threats;
to conduct naval operations in support of air and ground operations; to conduct
maritime law enforcement within the territorial waters and Exclusive Economic
Zone; to promote safety of life at sea and environment protection; and to
assist in national development efforts (NOQC Naval Orientation Reference
Handguide, 1997).

  The following are the
other relevant information about the Philippine Navy:

 

A.
Personnel -   1,687 Officers

 10,561
EP

 

 

  Marines  -  387 Officers

    7,142 EP

 

 

B.
Budget - P6.88B (see Annex C)

(Source: GAA 2000)

 

 

 

C.
Organizational Chart

 

 

 

 

 * The units highlighted in red ink will be the subjects
to be used to generalize the findings in this research as explained in the
Methodology chapter below.

 

AUTHORITY

 

  The authority
of the Philippine Navy and all government agencies to procure is “in accordance
with the guidelines prescribed under the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of Executive Order No. 302 (entitled ‘Providing Policies, Guidelines,
Rules and Regulations for the Procurement of Goods/Supplies by the National
Government’) dated February 19, 1996” (this was amended later by E.O. 262) “and
with due regard to the provisions of the Government Accounting and Auditing
Manual”. (Manual on Procurement, 1999). For the AFP, this was operationalized
by the Department of National Defense Department Order Nr 47 dated 30 April
1996 entitled “Delegation of Authority on Local Procurements” and further
regulated by J-4 Logistics Directive Nr PC-97-03 dated 01 August 1997.

 

 

 

 

 

PROCUREMENT PROCESS

 

 

 

RESEARCH
PROBLEMS

 

 This
research seeks to resolve the following problems:

 

1. Does corruption exist within the
procurement system of the Philippine Navy? If so, what are the different forms
of corruption being practiced? And, where within the PN bureaucracy do these
corrupt practices occur?

2. Is there a relationship between offices
exposed to boundary exchange and corruption propensity?

 

CONCEPTUAL
AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

 

This research covers two parts. The first
part is a descriptive analysis of the existence and extent of corruption, the
forms of corruption being practiced, as well as the other variables stated.

 

The second part will follow the theoretical
framework shown below:

 

From this framework, this research
hypothesizes that the boundary exchange processes between PN procurement
officials and accredited dealers, which work within the milieu of the
procurement system will result to bureaucratic corruption.

 

CONCEPTUAL
DEFINITIONS

 

1.
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION - is “defined as a dysfunctional and pathological act
that negates the accomplishment of its constitutional mandate of promoting
public interest” (Sosmena, 1999: 6).

2.
CORRUPTION – According to Klitgaard, “it is the misuse of a public office for
personal gain” (Sosmena, 1999). Corruption may be categorized into two:
individualized or systemic (Carino, 1985: 15). Individualized corruption is
where a person performs a secret moneymaking act in relation to his duties as
public official or government employee. While systemic corruption is committed
in an agency where “corruption has become so regularized and institutionalized
that organizational supports back wrong-doing and actually penalizes those who
live up to the old norms” (Caiden, 1977: 306). It is “demonstrated when
bureaucrats and clients can describe the same illegal process, including such
details as bribery rates per service and the way these are shared among the
members of the syndicate throughout the agency. Those with ‘initiative’ and
‘daring’ share the largesse with their colleagues with less opportunities, thus
engulfing everyone in an administrative culture that tolerates, even idolizes,
the fruits of corruption.” (Carino, 1985: 15)

3.
BOUNDARY EXCHANGE – “a value-free interaction” or exchange of boundaries
between the client and the public official (as defined by Dr Prosperina Tapales
during an interview conducted on 21 March 2002).

4.
PROCUREMENT OFFICIAL- for the purpose of this research, all PN officers,
enlisted personnel, and civilian employees involved in the PN procurement
system will be labeled as procurement officials. It will also include the
officials and personnel of the local Commission on Audit office.

5. FORMS OF CORRUPTION:

 A. Bribe
or Lagay
- also known as SOP, commission, porsyento, “for the boys”,
etc. This is “grease money” given to the procurement official by the dealer to
facilitate the processing of documents or as a return favor for a project
given.

B. Extortion
or Tong
- money demanded by the procurement official
to a dealer to facilitate the processing of documents.

C. Negotiated Canvass or Nego-
an arrangement made by the dealer and the procurement official to manipulate a
canvass method of procurement to ensure that the purchase order would be “won”
by the said dealer. This is done by giving all the canvass papers of a certain
project to the favored dealer. Thus, effectively depriving other interested
dealers.

D. Rigged Bidding or bidding-biddingan- an arrangement made by the dealer and the
procurement official/s to manipulate a public bidding method of procurement to
ensure that the purchase order would be “won” by the said dealer. This is done
by the collusion between all the attending bidders, which include the favored
dealer, and the Bids and Awards Committee.

E. Ghost Delivery or Conversion – the process in which government funds
allocated through budget releases are “converted” into cash. This is done by
preparing procurement documents taken from either a negotiated canvass or a
rigged bidding, then, instead of delivering the items stated in the purchase
order, the dealer would deliver the cash equivalent of the goods in the
purchase order, less certain percentages for the dealer’s profit.

F. Over-Pricing – to cover for the additional expenses
incurred by the lagay, the dealers and procurement official mutually
agree on setting the price, which are way above the authorized limits.

G. Under Delivery – again to cover for the additional
expenses incurred by the lagay, the dealers and procurement official
mutually agree that the quantity of the delivery would be lower than the one
specified in the purchase order.

H. Substitution – to circumvent certain prohibitions of the
law, specifically the General Appropriations Act, where certain gov’t agencies
have no capital outlay and, therefore, cannot buy equipment, the dealer and the
procurement official mutually agree to deliver items other than those stated in
the purchase order.

 

OPERATIONAL
DEFINITIONS

 

1. Perception of corruption on the PN
procurement system – this will be measured by asking the respondents the
question, “Sa pananaw ninyo, mayroon bang corruption sa procurement system
ng PN sa kasalukuyan?”

2. Perception of corruption on the
procurement system of major units of the PN – this will be measured by the
statement “Base sa inyong pananaw, sukatin ninyo ang level ng corruption ng
mga sumusunod na unit ng PN.
” To quantify the different levels, a fixed
ratio scale was formulated wherein a standardized value was assigned to a
corresponding level of corruption. A value of 0 was assigned for the level, walang
corruption
; 1 for the level, madalang ang corruption; 2 for the level,
di-gaano laganap ang corruption; 3 for the level, laganap ang
corruption
; 4 for the level, talamak ang corruption.

3. Perception of corruption of the different
offices involved in the procurement system- is measured by the question “Sa
pananaw ninyo, alin sa mga sumusunod na opisina na kasapi sa procurement system
ay mayroong nagaganap na corruption?”

4. Perception on the eradication of
corruption in the PN procurement system- is measured by the question “Kayo
ba ay pabor na alisin ang corruption sa procurement system ng PN?

 

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

 

 While there are volumes of literature on
corruption, there are very rare writings that directly dealt with corruption on
the procurement system of a military organization or any government agency for that
matter. One such writing is the article for the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism by Malou C. Mangahas entitled “Kickbacks and
Negotiated Deals mar AFP Procurement System”. While the said article made some
startling revelations, it did so under conditions of “journalistic freedom”,
where the data gathered came as unstructured information fed by people from
both inside and outside of the organization (AFP) and, therefore, lacks the
criteria of validity and reliability to support its findings as in a technical
research.

 

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

 

 The Martial Law years have created a fearful
reputation for the AFP organizations. Because of this, no group has ever dared
to conduct any formal research on corruption on the procurement system of a
military organization. Thus, the significance of this research couldn’t
possibly be overstated.

 This
research will provide a vivid picture of what used to be a restricted domain of
the AFP. It can also be seen as a microcosmic representation of the procurement
systems of various government agencies. 

 

METHODOLOGY

 

RESEARCH DESIGN

 

The survey design was used since it is the
most applicable for the quantitative-descriptive and quantitative-explanatory
approaches of this research. 

 

UNITS OF ANALYSIS

 

The following are the units of analysis:

 

 1.
The Philippine Navy. It is represented by its five major units based in the
Manila-Cavite area namely; Headquarters Philippine Navy, Headquarters Support
Group (HPN,HSG); Headquarters Philippine Fleet (HPHILFLT); Headquarters
Philippine Marines (HPMAR); Naval Logistic Center (NLC) and the Naval Sea
Systems Command (NASSCOM). These units were chosen because of their huge
individual budgets and, therefore, are the main procuring agencies of the PN.

A. HPN,HSG – The support unit of the main
headquarters of the PN.

B. HPHILFLT – One of two operating arms of the
PN. This unit has the administrative control over all floating and air assets.

C. HPMAR – The other operating arm of the PN.
It has administrative control over all Philippine Marine (PMAR) brigades and
other PMAR units.

D. NLC – The main procuring agency of the PN.
It is responsible for supplying the bulk of the logistical requirements of the
whole PN.

E. NASSCOM – The main service support group of
the PN. It is also responsible for the repair of ships and other major
equipment.

2. All offices involved in the procurement
process (as shown in the diagram above).

3. Accredited dealers of the PN. 

 

RESPONDENTS

 

The respondents chosen are the accredited
dealers of the PN because they are considered to be insiders in the procurement
system and they would be easier subjects to extract confidential information
from, than the officials involved in the procurement system. 

 

TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION

 

A primary technique of data collection
(questionnaire) was used for this research. As for the sampling strategy, a
simple random sampling from a sample frame of all accredited dealers of the PN
was initially planned. However, it was found that there was no updated list available
and the said non-current list contained inactive or inexistent dealers, which
made probability sampling inapplicable. Hence, purposive sampling methods were
resorted to. 

 

STATISTICAL TOOLS

 

Chi-square Statistic was used to establish
the relationship between two nominal variables namely; boundary exchange and
corruption. The application of said statistical tool was facilitated by the use
of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software.

 

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

 

Due to the sensitivity of the research
subject, which could expose or incriminate a military organization like the
Philippine Navy, the respondents may not have fully detached themselves from
the physical or professional risks involved, despite the assurances of the
researcher. Thus, the objectivity of some of their answers may have been
affected by the fear of reprisal.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

FINDINGS

 

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

 

PROFILE OF THE
RESPONDENTS

 

 Of the 30 accredited dealers chosen as respondents, only
1 (3.3%) is a male while 29 (96.7%) are females (Table 1). This could be
explained by the conjecture that since the PN is a male-dominated workplace,
having females as dealers may help in facilitating business transactions.

 

TABLE 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
BY GENDER

 

Gender

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent
 

 

 

 

 

Female

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

29

 

 

96.7
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Male

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

3.3
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

30

 

 

100.0
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
ON THE PHILIPPINE NAVY PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

 

 The frequency distribution on the perception of
corruption on the PN procurement system yielded an absolute (100%) affirmative
answer that corruption does exist. (See TABLE2)

 

PERCEPTION OF THE LEVEL OF
CORRUPTION ON THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM OF THE MAJOR UNITS OF THE PN

 

 HPHILFLT scored the lowest at 1.43 and falls under the
level of madalang ang corruption. This is due mainly to the integrity
and moral resolve of its incumbent commander, RAdm Ruben G Domingo. Most of the
respondents even qualified their answers in a way that if it weren’t for the lagay
at COA, HPHILFLT would have been corruption-free. HPN,HSG came in a distant
second with a score of 2.30, followed by the HPMAR at 2.39. Both of these units
fall under the level of di-gaano laganap ang corruption. The most
corrupt PN units as far as the dealers were concerned were NASSCOM (2.87) and
NLC (2.95), whose scores fall under the level of laganap ang corruption.
According to them, the high levels of corruption of these units were caused by
their commanders’ blatant negative bureaucratic behavior. (See TABLE 3)

 

FORMS OF CORRUPTION

 

 The most common form of corruption being practiced is the
lagay, which recorded a 100% frequency. This was followed by the
“negotiated canvass” at 86.7% and “rigged bidding” at 76.7%. The least
practiced is the “under delivery” at 36.7%. (See TABLES 4 and 5)

 

REASONS WHY CORRUPTION IS
BEING RESORTED TO

 

 The main reason why corruption is being resorted to by
the dealer is, in order “to expedite the processing of documents” (96.7%). A
significant number of respondents (63.33%) also said that another reason is “to
be able to get a project or transaction”. While only 36.7% of the respondents
answered that utang na loob was the reason. (See TABLE 6)

 

WHO INITIATES CORRUPTION?

 

On
the question of “who initiates corruption?”, a significant number (83.3%)
claimed that the corrupt practices were mutually agreed upon by both parties
with neither one initiating directly. Instead, these under-the-table
transactions have become a routine activity that it had evolved to an SOP or
standard operating procedure. (See TABLE 7)

 

PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION
PER OFFICE

 

 Surprisingly, the offices, which emerged as the top three
from the frequency distribution, are civilian offices; the Commission on Audit
(100%); the Accounting Office (66.7%); and the Supply Accountable Office
(66.7%). While the finding for the COA is indisputable, a big factor in the
findings for other two offices could be that the dealers are more willing to
volunteer information against civilian employees than against military
officers.

 Among the military offices, the procurement office
figured the highest in terms of corruption perception at 60%. It is followed by
the logistics office and the Commander’s office both at 56.7%. The Bids &
Awards Committee (16.7%), Deputy Commander’s office (20%) and Chief of Staff
office (20%) are the three lowest in terms of corruption perception. (See TABLE
8) 

 

IS THERE A FIXED RATE OF
“LAGAY’ PER OFFICE

 

 According to all 30 respondents, there is a fixed rate of
lagay per office. However, this finding is deceiving because, while it
is applicable to the COA where there is consistency in the fixed rate indicated
by the respondents at 1-2% of the total amount of the purchase order, the
entries for the other offices had a wide range of variance. This could be
explained by the tendency of the dealers to get confused in assigning fixed
values for every office. They further qualified that these are dependent on the
total amount of the transaction. At any rate, the finding for the COA is very
significant and indisputable at the same time. (See TABLES 9 and 10)

 

IS IT PROFITABLE TO DEAL
WITH THE PN? 

 

28
out of 30 respondents (93.3%) felt that despite the existence of corruption,
transacting business is still profitable. This could give us an idea of the
high profit margins being padded by the dealers on the goods and services
delivered to the end-users just to cover for the expenses incurred by the
corrupt practices. (See TABLE 12)

 

PERCEPTION ON THE
ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION IN THE PN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

 

 Amazingly, a slight majority of the respondents (53.3%)
were not in favor of the eradication of corruption, while 46.7% felt otherwise.
One possible explanation for this is that the dealers who did not favor the
eradication of corruption are apprehensive that a level playing field may not
assure them of getting transactions and, thus, not favor them as much as the
status quo. Specifically, a level playing field will negate whatever “business”
connections they have with those with discretionary powers. (See TABLE 13)

 

INFERENTIAL STATISTICS

 

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
CORRUPTION PROPENSITY AND BOUDARY EXCHANGE

 

 Chi-square statistic was used to
establish if there is a relationship between boundary exchange and corruption
propensity for every office involved in the procurement system. Of the 12
offices subjected to the research, only the Deputy Commander’s office and Bids
& Awards Committee obtained a significance level higher than the 0.05
threshold set to conclusively establish a relationship. Hence, for these two
offices, there was not enough evidence to conclude that there is a
relationship. But for each of the other offices, the relationship between
boundary exchange and corruption propensity was found to be conclusive.

 

COMMANDER’S
OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19.615

 

 

1

 

 

.000
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the office
of the Commander, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly
related. Of the 17 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
office of the Commander, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the
said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of
19.615 and significance level of 0.000.

 

DEPUTY COMMANDER’S OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.750

 

 

1

 

 

.053
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The chi-square test value of 3.75 and
significance level of 0.053 will indicate to us that, at the office of the
Deputy Commander, there is not enough data to conclude that corruption
propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of the 6 respondents who
had perceived that there is corruption at the said office, 4 (66.66%) had
boundary exchange processes, while 2 respondents (33.33%) did not.

 

CHIEF
OF STAFF OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.868

 

 

1

 

 

.015
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the office of
the Chief of Staff, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly
related. Of the 6 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
office of the Chief of Staff, 5 (83.3%) of them had boundary exchange processes
with the said office while only 1 (16.66%) did not. Statistically, this is
validated by the chi-square test value of 5.868 and significance level of
0.015.

 

LOGISTICS OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11.940

 

 

1

 

 

.001
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the
Logistic Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly
related. Of the 17 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
Logistic Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 11.940
and significance level of 0.001.

 

COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.684

 

 

1

 

 

.003
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the
Comptroller Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly
related. Of the 10 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
Comptroller Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 8.684
and significance level of 0.003.

 

PROCUREMENT OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5.000

 

 

1

 

 

.025
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the Procurement
Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
the 18 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Procurement
Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office.
Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 5.000 and
significance level of 0.025.

 

SUPPLY ACCOUNTABLE OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.667

 

 

1

 

 

.010
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the Supply
Accountable Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly
related. Of the 20 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the
Supply Accountable Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the
said office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of
6.667 and significance level of 0.010.

 

COMMISION
ON AUDIT

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value
 

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N
  of Valid Cases

 

 

 

 

 

30
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The SPSS could not compute statistically the
chi-square value and significance level of the given data because the variable
of corruption perception at the Commission on Audit was misread as a constant since
all the respondents perceived the COA to be corrupt. Nonetheless, by looking at
the Cross Tabulation count, of the 30 respondents who perceived COA to be
corrupt, 28 (93.33%) had boundary exchange processes at the said office. Hence,
corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. 

 

FINANCE OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.563

 

 

1

 

 

.010
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the Finance
Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related. Of
the 14 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Finance Office
of the Commander, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said
office. Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 6.563
and significance level of 0.010.

 

TECHNICAL INSPECTION COMMITTEE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6.982

 

 

1

 

 

.008
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the
Technical Inspection Committee, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are
directly related. Of the 13 respondents who perceived that there is corruption
at the Technical Inspection Committee, all of them had boundary exchange
processes with the said office. Statistically, this is validated by the
chi-square test value of 6.982 and significance level of 0.008.

 

BIDS & AWARDSS COMMITTEE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3.409

 

 

1

 

 

.065
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The chi-square test value of 3.409 and
significance level of 0.065 will indicate to us that, at the Bids and Awards
Committee, there is not enough data to conclude that corruption propensity and boundary
exchange are directly related. Of the 5 respondents who perceived that there is
corruption at the office of the Commander, 3 (60%) of them had boundary
exchange processes with the said office while 2 respondents (40%) did not.

 

ACCOUNTING OFFICE

 

Chi-Square Tests

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value

 

 

df

 

 

Asymp.
  Sig. (2-sided)

 

 

 

 

Pearson
  Chi-Square

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4.286

 

 

1

 

 

.038
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANALYSIS:

 

The data indicate to us that, at the
Accounting Office, corruption propensity and boundary exchange are directly related.
Of the 20 respondents who perceived that there is corruption at the Accounting
Office, all of them had boundary exchange processes with the said office.
Statistically, this is validated by the chi-square test value of 4.286 and
significance level of 0.038.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

 Based on the data
gathered, the following are the conclusions:

 

 1. There is
corruption in the Philippine Navy procurement system
. However, the levels
of corruption of the different units of the PN varied and are dependent on the corruptive
or non-corruptive behavior of their respective Commanders.

 2. There are several
forms of corruption being practiced. These are; lagay, negotiated
canvass, rigged bidding, “ghost delivery”, overpricing, tong,
substitution and under delivery.

 3. The main reason why
corruption is being resorted to is to expedite the processing of documents.
Also, the corruptive behavior is not initiated by the dealer nor the
procurement official instead, the practice had become a routine that both
parties readily and mutually agree on the terms.

 4. All offices involved
in the procurement system had corruption incidences. However, some offices were
perceived to be more corrupt than the others. Ironically, the COA, which is
supposed to be the watchdog of the government against corruption, got a 100%
response in corruption perception.

 5. There is a prevailing
fixed rate of lagay. However, this is dependent on the amount of
transaction except for the COA, where the consistent response yielded the
amount of lagay at 1-2% of the amount of the transaction.

 6. The data gathered validated the hypothesis
inferred from the theoretical framework that boundary exchange processes
between the procurement officials and accredited dealers, which work within the
milieu of the procurement process, will result to bureaucratic corruption.
However, this is not applicable to offices, which have no discretionary powers,
as in the case of the Deputy Commander’s office and to offices, which are already
part of the largesse as in the case of the BAC.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

 There are only two
practical recommendations that can be formulated as a result of this study.
First, is for the PN to strictly adhere to the merit system of promotion and
selection of officers to be designated as commanders of its different units.
The primary criteria for qualification should be an officer who possesses
technical competence and vision to effectively formulate reforms and, more
importantly, he should have the moral integrity and political will to implement
these reforms.

 The other recommendation
is to limit the boundary exchange processes to the front line levels only so as
to totally insulate the other offices. This way, these offices can perform
their review and inspection functions with a more independent and dispassionate
perspective.

 

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

 

 This research has opened
a floodgate for future investigative researches. Foremost of which is an
operations research on the auditing processes of the COA. It is very
frustrating to know that the very agency tasked to weed out corruption was
unanimously found to be the most corrupt office. Another future study is a
policy research to formulate policies to address this endemic problem of
bureaucratic corruption.

 

 

 

TABLES

 

 

TABLE2: PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION ON THE PN
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 3: MEAN/STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE LEVELS OF
CORRUPTION PER PN UNIT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N

 

 

Minimum

 

 

Maximum

 

 

Mean

 

 

Std. Deviation

 

 

HPN,HSG

 

 

20

 

 

1

 

 

4

 

 

2.30

 

 

1.08

 

 

HPHILFLT

 

 

23

 

 

0

 

 

4

 

 

1.43

 

 

.99

 

 

HPMAR

 

 

18

 

 

1

 

 

4

 

 

2.39

 

 

1.14

 

 

NLC

 

 

22

 

 

1

 

 

4

 

 

2.95

 

 

1.13

 

 

NASSCOM

 

 

23

 

 

1

 

 

4

 

 

2.87

 

 

1.18

 

 

TABLE 4: FREQUENCY OF DEALERS’ EXPOSURE
TO/EXPERIENCE ON CORRUPTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 5: FREQUENCIES OF DEALERS’ EXPOSURE/EXPERIENCE ON THE
VARIOUS FORMS OF CORRUPTION

 

"LAGAY" 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 "TONG"

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

17

 

 

56.7

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

narinig

 

 

12

 

 

40.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

NEGOTIATED CANVASS OR "NEGO"   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

26

 

 

86.7

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

narinig

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

RIGGED BIDDING

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

23

 

 

76.7

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

5

 

 

16.7

 

 

narinig

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

GHOST DELIVERY or CONVERSION  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

18

 

 

60.0

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

narinig

 

 

9

 

 

30.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

OVER PRICING

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

18

 

 

60.0

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

7

 

 

23.3

 

 

narinig

 

 

5

 

 

16.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

UNDER DELIVERY  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

11

 

 

36.7

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

narinig

 

 

16

 

 

53.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

SUBSTITUTION

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

nagawa

 

 

13

 

 

43.3

 

 

nasaksihan

 

 

5

 

 

16.7

 

 

narinig

 

 

12

 

 

40.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

TABLE 6: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF DEALERS’ REASONS
WHY CORRUPTION IS BEING RESORTED TO

 

REASON: To be able to
get a project or transaction. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

19

 

 

63.3

 

 

no

 

 

11

 

 

36.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

REASON: To help expedite the
processing of documents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

29

 

 

96.7

 

 

no

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

REASON: ”Utang na loob” for those who gave the
project.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

11

 

 

36.7

 

 

no

 

 

19

 

 

63.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 7: WHO INITIATES CORRUPTION?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

dealer

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

procurement system
  official

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

nagkakaintindihan na o ‘SOP’ na

 

 

25

 

 

83.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 8: PERCEPTION
OF CORRUPTION PER OFFICE

 

Commander   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

17

 

 

56.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

13

 

 

43.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Deputy Commander

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

6

 

 

20.0

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

24

 

 

80.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Chief of Staff  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

6

 

 

20.0

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

24

 

 

80.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Logistics Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

17

 

 

56.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

13

 

 

43.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Comptroller’s Office  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

10

 

 

33.3

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

20

 

 

66.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Procurement Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

18

 

 

60.0

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

12

 

 

40.0

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Supply Accountable Office   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

20

 

 

66.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

10

 

 

33.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Commission on Audit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Finance Office  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

14

 

 

46.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

16

 

 

53.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Technical Inspection Committee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

13

 

 

43.3

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

17

 

 

56.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Bids & Awards Committee  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

5

 

 

16.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

25

 

 

83.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Accounting Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

corrupt

 

 

20

 

 

66.7

 

 

not corrupt

 

 

10

 

 

33.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

TABLE 9: IS THERE A FIXED RATE OF “LAGAY” PER OFFICE?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

TABLE 10: FIXED
RATE OF CORRUPTION PER OFFICE

 

Commander   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

14

 

 

46.7

 

 

1 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

10-15 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

10 percent

 

 

6

 

 

20.0

 

 

20 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

5 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000-20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Deputy Commander   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

25

 

 

83.3

 

 

depends

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P5,000.00 up

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Chief of Staff

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

26

 

 

86.7

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00 up

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Logistics Office  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

19

 

 

63.3

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

1 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Comptroller Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

21

 

 

70.0

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

1 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000-20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Procurement Office    

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

15

 

 

50.0

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

1 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

10 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

depends

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-5,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000-5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000-20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Commission on Audit

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

1-2 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

1 percent

 

 

20

 

 

66.7

 

 

1.5 percent

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

2 percent

 

 

5

 

 

16.7

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Supply Accountable Office   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

12

 

 

40.0

 

 

.5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

1 percent

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

3 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-1,500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P1.000-3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000-5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P300.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

SOP only

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Finance

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

16

 

 

53.3

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

1 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000-5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100/head

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P200.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500-1,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P500.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

Technical Inspection Committee 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

17

 

 

56.7

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100/head

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000-20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P200.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P3,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P500-1,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500.00

 

 

3

 

 

10.0

 

 

P600.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Bids & Awards Committee

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

26

 

 

86.7

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

depends

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

Accounting Office

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

 

 

 

10

 

 

33.3

 

 

0.5 percent

 

 

4

 

 

13.3

 

 

1 percent

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

depends

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P1,000.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

P100-10,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100-500

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P100/head

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000-20,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000-5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P2,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P5,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500-1,000.00

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

P500.00

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

SOP only

 

 

1

 

 

3.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

TABLE 11: EXISTENCE OF BOUNDARY EXCHANGE PROCESSES

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 12: IS IT PROFITABLE TO DEAL WITH THE PN?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes

 

 

28

 

 

93.3

 

 

no

 

 

2

 

 

6.7

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

TABLE 13: PERCEPTION ON THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION
FROM THE PN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency

 

 

Percent

 

 

yes/in favor

 

 

14

 

 

46.7

 

 

no/not in favor

 

 

16

 

 

53.3

 

 

Total

 

 

30

 

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

REFERENCES

 

Caiden, Gerald and Naomi

1977 Administrative
Corruption
. As quoted in Carino, Ledivina V. 1985.International Review of
Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public Administrations No.1
1985.

 

Carino, Ledivina V.

1985 The
Politicization of the Philippine Bureaucracy: Corruption or Commitment?,
International
Review of Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public Administrations
No.1 1985.

 

Mangahas, Malou C.

2001 Kickbacks and
Negotiated Deals Mar AFP Procurement System (Corruption-free modernization?).

A PCIJ Report downloaded from PCIJ website at www.
PCIJ
. org

 

Pazzibugan, Dona

2001 Golez: Military row inevitable given Wong’s
‘crusading mode’. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 28

 

Pablo, Carlito and Nocum,
Armando

2001 AFP
turmoil worsens. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 27

2001 Wong links Biazon to mess. Philippine
Daily Inquirer
. Feb 28

 

Sosmena, Gaudioso

1999 Concept of
Bureaucratic Sedition
. Vol II No.6. NDCP Occasional paper

 

1996 Department of National Defense Department
Order Nr 47
dated 30 April

 

1997 2NFSU
Manual on Procurement
,
Zambales

 

1997 AFP
J-4 Logistics Directive Nr PC-97-03

dated 01 August

 

1998 NOQC Naval Orientation Reference
Handguide
, Zambales, Naval

School

Center

 

1999 Manual on Procurement. COA-PTTAF.

Quezon City

; Adriana
Printing Co Inc.

 

2000 Gen Appropriations Act. Downloaded from
DBM website at www. DBM.gov.ph 

 

 

 

 

QUESTIONNAIRE

 

Ang impormasyon na ibibigay
ninyo dito sa questionnaire na ito ay hindi makakalabas kahit kanino lamang.
Ito ay isang academic study na ginagawa ng mga graduate students ng University
of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, bilang bahagi ng kanilang course
requirements para sa degree na Master of Public Administration.
Ito ay hindi kunektado kahit anumang paraan sa pamamalakad ng Philippine
Navy. Dahil dito, wala sa sagot ninyo ang makakaapekto sa mga transaksyon
ninyo, ngayon man o sa hinaharap, sa nasabing organisasyon.
(The information that would
be given in this questionnaire would be treated with strict confidentiality.
This is an academic study being conducted by graduate students of the
University of the

Philippines

,
Diliman Quezon City, as part of the course requirements of their degree in
Master of Public Administration. This study is not connected in any way with
the affairs of the Philippine Navy and, therefore, none of your answers in this
questionnaire would affect your current and future transactions with the said
organization.)

 

NAME
(optional)_____________________ BUSINESS NAME (optional) ___________________

AGE ___________ SEX
____________

 

1. Kayo ba ay isang
accredited dealer ng Philippnie Navy (PN)? _____ (Oo/Hindi). Kung oo, gaano
katagal na kayo bilang isang accredited dealer ng PN?_______

2. Alin sa mga sumusunod na
unit ng PN kayo nakikipag-deal o nakapag-deal na?

 

____ a. Headquarters
Philippine Navy HHSG(HPN, HSG) 

____ b. Headquarters
Philippine Fleet (HPHILFLT)

____ c. Headquarters
Philippine Marines (HPMAR)

____ d. Naval Logistic
Center (NLC)

____ e. Naval Sea Systems
Command (NASSCOM)

 

3. Sa pananaw ninyo meron bang corruption sa procurement system ng PN sa
kasalukuyan?
_____
(Oo/Hindi). Kung oo, base sa inyong pananaw, sukatin ninyo ang level ng
corruption ng mga sumusunod na unit ng PN. Lagyan ng check sa ilalim ng hanay
na angkop na level ng corruption para sa bawat unit.

 

:Walang :madalang ang :Di gaano laganap: laganap ang  :talamak ang :

________ :corruption :corruption :ang corruption  : corruption  :corruption :

a. HPN, HSG : : :  :  : : 

b. HPHILFLT : : :  :  : :

c. HPMAR : : :  :  : :

d. NLC : : :  :  : :

e. NASSCOM : : :  :  : :

 

4. Sa mga pakikipag-deal
ninyo sa PN, nakagawa/nakasaksi/nakarinig na ba kayo ng kahit na anong uri ng
corruption? _____ (Oo/Hindi). Kung oo, alin sa mga sumusunod na uri ng
corruption ang nagawa/nasaksihan/narinig ninyo? (Lagyan ng G sa guhit kung ito
ay nagawa na ninyo, S - kung nasaksihan lamang, R – kung narinig lamang sa iba
at D – kung di ninyo alam kung ano ito.)

 

____ a.LAGAY - kilala din
bilang SOP, commission, porsyento, etc.,.  

____ b. TONG - extortion,
paghingi ng pera o pabor ng isang taong kasapi sa procurement system.  

____ c. NEGOTIATED CANVASS o
“NEGO” - pag areglo ng isang dealer sa isang taong kasapi sa procurement system
para makuha ang isang purchase order (

PO

) para
di na dumaan sa actual canvass.

____ d. RIGGED BIDDING o
“BIDDING-BIDDINGAN” – lutong macao, isang bidding na magkakasabwat ang
mga kasapi o di kaya alam na kung sino ang mananalo bago pa simulan ang
bidding.

____ e. GHOST DELIVERY o CONVERSION – pagbigay ng dealer ng pera sa halip
na I-deliver ang mga bagay na nakalagay sa PO.

____ f. OVER PRICING – pag presyo ng higit pa sa nararapat na tubo .

____ g. UNDER DELIVERY – pag deliver ng mga bagay na nakalahad sa PO ngunit
kulang sa bilang.

____ h. SUBSTITUTION – pag deliver ng bagay na iba sa nakalahad sa PO.

 

 

 

5. Kung nakagawa na kayo kahit anumang uri ng corruption na nailahad, ano
ang dahilan o mga dahilan kung bakit ninyo ito nagawa?

 

____ a. Para magka-project.

____ b. Para bumilis ang papel.

____ c. Utang na loob sa nagbigay ng project.

____ d. Ibang dahilan.(Isulat ang dahilan.)
______________________________________.

 

6. Sa pagkaalam ninyo, sino ang madalas na nag-i-initiate ng corruption sa
procurement system?

 

____ a. Dealer

____ b. Opisyal ng PN
(kasama na ang SAO, Accountant at COA)

____ c. Pareho ng nagkakintindihan dahil nakasanayan na sa sistema o SOP
na.

 

7. Sa pananaw ninyo alin sa mga sumusunod na opisina na kasapi sa
procurement system na pinagdaraanan ng papel (PO o voucher) ninyo ay mayroong
nagaganap na corruption?
Lagyan ng check ang mga opisinang may corruption sa inyong
pananaw. 

 

____ a. Commander ____ b. Deputy
Commander  ____ c. Chief of Staff

____ d. Logistic Office (N4,
F4, LC4,etc) ____ e. Comptroller Office
(N6,F6, LC6, etc) ____ f. Procurement Office 

____ g. Supply Accountable
Office(SAO)____ h. Commission on Audit (COA)  ____ i. Finance Office

____ j. Technical Inspection Committee ____ k.  Bids
& Awards Committee  ____ l. Accounting Office

 

8. Mayroon bang karaniwang halaga ng lagay, commission o porsyento
para sa bawat opisina na kasapi sa procurement system? _____ (Oo/Hindi). Kung
oo, maari ba ninyong isulat ang halaga ng lagay, commission o porsyento
sa katabi ng mga sumusunod na opisina.

 

________ a. Commander ________ b.
Deputy Commander

________ c. Chief of Staff ________ d.
Logistic Office (N4, F4, LC4,etc)

________ e. Comptroller
Office (N6,F6, etc)  ________ f.
Procurement Office 

________ g. Supply
Accountable Office(SAO) ________ h.
Commission on Audit (COA)

________ i. Finance Office ________ j.
Technical Inspection Committee

________ k. Bids &
Awards Committee ________ l.
Accounting Office

  

9. Kayo ba ay
pinahihintulutan pumasok sa mga opisinang ito para kumuha ng project, upang
mag-follow-up ng inyong papel (

PO

o voucher),
o para sa anumang dahilan? _____ (Oo/Hindi). Kung oo, lagyan ng check alinman
sa mga sumusunod na opisina kung saan kayo ay pinahihintuluyan pumapasok para
kumuha ng project, upang mag-follow-up ng inyong papel (

PO

o voucher), o para sa anumang dahilan?

 

________ a. Commander ________ b.
Deputy Commander

________ c. Chief of Staff ________ d.
Logistic Office (N4, F4, LC4,etc)

________ e. Comptroller
Office (N6,F6, etc)  ________ f.
Procurement Office 

________ g. Supply
Accountable Office(SAO) ________ h.
Commission on Audit (COA)

________ i. Finance Office ________ j.
Technical Inspection Committee

________ k. Bids &
Awards Committee ________ l.
Accounting Office

 

10. Kayo ba ay kumikita sa
ganitong sistema? _____ (Oo/Hindi).

 

11. Kayo ba ay pabor na
alisin ang corruption sa procurement system ng PN? _____ (Oo/Hindi).

 

 

MARAMING
SALAMAT

PO

!

 

Corruption in the Philippine Navy

January 5th, 2007 by sonnytrillanes4

 

 

A Study of

Corruption in the Philippine Navy

 

 

By:

 

LTJG ANTONIO F
TRILLANES IV PN

October 2001

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

On 26 May 2001, Abu
Sayyaf bandits kidnapped 20 persons from Dos Palmas, an up-scale resort in PalawanThe next day, a joint task force was formed to
conduct pursuit operations (PDI, 27 May 2001). On 28 May, a reconnaissance
plane spotted the kidnappers’ group aboard three boats approaching the Mapun
Island Group (MIG)(PDI, 28 May 2001). Immediately, four navy patrol crafts were
dispatched to conduct a naval blockade on the island. Then finally on 31 May,
Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claimed that they have slipped through the
naval blockade and are now in Sulu and Basilan (PDI, 31 May 2001). Presidential
Spokesperson Rigoberto Tiglao quickly forgave the Navy for its ineffectiveness
when he said: “the gunmen’s boats had top speeds of 40 knots, way beyond the
capability of the Philippine Navy. Using that type of craft they would have
eaten up the wide expanse of Sulu Sea between Palawan
and Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi (Mapun) in five hours” (PDI, 28 May 2001). Tiglao
further stressed: “The biggest problem really is the Philippine Navy has few
patrol boats. There are plans to increase the number of these patrol boats”
(PDI, 28 May 2001). These statements coming from the presidential spokesperson
clearly signified three things: First, is the cluelessness of the GMA
Administration as regards the true situation on the ground and its total
reliance on sanitized information given by the AFP leadership; Second, is its
ignorance on the capabilities of its navy; Last, is the GMA Administration’s
penchant for tolerating grossly incompetent acts of the AFP, in this case the
Navy, due to her political indebtedness to it for being primarily responsible
for installing her as President of the Republic.

The kidnappers
actually used motor launches (lancha)
that run a measly 12 knots as seen by the Air Force reconnaissance plane and
reported to the Western Command. This probably explains why the kidnappers
reportedly took two days (and not 5 hours as Tiglao said) to travel from Dos
Palmas to MIG. Besides, the kumpit
(fast motor boats used by smugglers in the South), while it is true that it can
run up to 40 knots (without load), it is never used for prolonged sorties as it
easily runs out of fuel. Its reported fuel consumption is approx 500 liters/hr
at speed of 40 knots. For it to traverse Dos Palmas to Mapun and eventually to
Basilan, they would need space for at least 10 drums of fuel aside from the
space that the kidnappers and hostages would occupy. For a sleek boat, which
measures no more than 60 feet, this is impossible unless they had a convoy of
at least 5 kumpits, which is
totally unheard of, and costs around P25 million.

The four navy patrol
crafts should have successfully blockaded MIG, which only has a land area of
approximately 30 square nautical miles (n.mi.), had they been deployed
correctly. Each craft has a navigational/surface search radar that has an
effective scanning radius of 6 n.mi.. This means that if properly positioned,
the four patrol crafts’ radar sweeps should have overlapped at least at the
middle, thus covering the whole MIG upto 3 n.mi. off the coastlines. However,
as it happened the Task Group Commander in charge of the blockade, relying
heavily on intelligence reports, positioned all four crafts 1n.mi off Tandatao
Pt of Mapun mainland at 500-yard intervals thus minimizing their surface search
capabilities. The Naval Special Warfare Group team that landed in the area
supposedly to rescue the hostages found out that indeed one of the boats used
was anchored near Tandatao Pt, but the kidnappers’ group was either in
Pamelikan Is or Binlut Is, the northern islands of MIG and both were way beyond
radar range from where the crafts were positioned thus, enabling the group to
slip off to Basilan.

The escape of the Abu
Sayyaf through the naval blockade was one tactical blunder that caused great
humiliation and enormous costs to the country. To be simply ignored and
forgiven by the President (through Tiglao’s statement) was a display of
weakness as a Commander-In-Chief of the AFP. But the President could not have
been that stupid and weak, as this gesture had showed. Thus, it is rather safe
to conclude that, as mentioned earlier, it was her political indebtedness and
fear of the AFP that prevented her from imposing sanctions lest she suffers the
same fate as former President Estrada through another “withdrawal of support”
by the AFP. These unfortunate political concessions, first demonstrated in the
case of RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP during the PN leadership crisis that occurred
in February 2001(to be discussed later in this paper), while it would favor
certain officers, could further deteriorate the Navy, and the AFP.

While it would seem
that the incident cited above has dwelt more on incompetence and
ineffectiveness, this paper will show that this is just one manifestation of
the ill effects of corruption in the Navy. More specifically, how corruption
made this incident even possible to happen in the first place.

Through the years,
the Navy top brass have always raised the issues of obsolescence and shortage
of operating assets of the fleet to cover for the Navy’s ineffectiveness. But
is this really the case? Or, is it simply caused by an institutionalized
corruption that exists in all levels and in all areas of the organization? If
so, then what is the cost? How could this problem be solved? These are the
questions that this paper intends to answer.

In going about the
discussion, a brief look at the history of the Navy will be necessary to
appreciate its importance and relevance to the country. Other basic facts about
the organization will also be laid down to provide the necessary backdrop to
the main subject of the paper.

 

THE PHILIPPINE NAVY

 

THE PAST

 

The Insurgent Navy

 

The Philippine Navy traces its roots way back to the
Philippine Revolution against Spain
with the hand-over by the Americans of a captured Spanish steam pinnace to Gen
Emilio Aguinaldo on 20 May 1898. The vessel was renamed Magdalo and emerged as the first watercraft of the navy. Soon, several other merchant ships
donated by patriots were added to form a nascent fleet. The Insurgent Navy was
instrumental to the revolutionary cause through its conduct of basic naval
operations such as troop deployments and arms shipments. The first successful
amphibious assault against a Spanish garrison was even spearheaded by the Magdalo at Bacoor Bay
on 26 May 1898. Its effectiveness went on throughout the Fil-Am War. However,
after the capture of Pres. Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901, the insurgent navy
disintegrated. (Zulueta, 1998: 20)

 

The
Off-Shore Patrol

The Navy was reborn with the creation of the Off-Shore
Patrol (OSP) on 14 April 1938. A few patrol crafts and three high-speed torpedo
boats, also known as Q-boats, were the pioneers of this force. They were
intended to form part of a nucleus of 55 Q-boats that would repel enemy
amphibious landings as Gen Douglas McArthur had envisioned. But before the
acquisition of more Q-boats, war had broken out. As a consequence, the OSP was
relegated to other roles such as; troop insertions, intelligence operations and
ferry missions. Though they had a few skirmishes with Japanese Navy ships and
warplanes, after the fall of Bataan on 08
April 1942, all ships of the OSP had to be scuttled. (Giagonia, 1997: 147)

 

The
Post-War Navy

After World War II, the country had a surplus of war
materiel given by the US Among which were 83 ships of various types. Thus the OSP was reorganized and
upgraded into the Philippine Naval Patrol, to become a major command of the
AFP. On 23 December 1950, through E.O. 389, the Philippine Naval Patrol was
renamed as the Philippine Navy. (Giagonia, 1997: 245)

For the next four decades, the Navy experienced a
confluence of events and performed various roles in furtherance of national
security interests and national development. In the 1950’s, the significant
roles were to conduct counter insurgency operations against the Hukbalahap and ferry missions during
the Korean War. These were followed by the anti-smuggling and anti piracy
operations in Sulu where the Navy was credited for destroying the network of
illegal operations of the most notorious band of pirates and outlaws, including
the dreaded Kamlon. The 1960’s
were highlighted by activities such as the ferry missions during the Vietnam
War and by the bilateral and multi-lateral naval exercises that further
strengthened the Navy’s maritime defense posture in the region. The
anti-smuggling and anti-piracy operations in the south were also sustained
during this era (Giagonia, 1997: 247-272). Throughout the 1970’s up to the
early 1980’s, the Navy reverted to its counter-insurgency mode this time
against two fronts, the Muslim secessionists and the communists (Zulueta, 1998:
44). During the 1986 EDSA Revolt, eighty five percent of the Navy joined the
rebels led by then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and then AFP Vice
Chief of Staff and PC Chief Fidel V Ramos. ( Giagonia, 1997: 310)

According to Zulueta: “By the time things were
simmering down to a semblance of peace quiet in the early 1990’s, the American
naval and air forces, stung by the Philippine Senate’s rejection of a treaty
that would have prolonged their stay in the Philippines, were leaving in a
huff. Suddenly, the Philippines
saw its ‘surrogate’ navy and air force heading for the gates of Subic and Clark leaving the resident highly anxious about its
national defense.” (Zulueta, 1998: 46)

Commo Jose Francisco, former FOIC, on commenting about
the American withdrawal, aptly stated “All throughout the years the Americans
were here, we had the military assistance agreement with them and logistical
support from them, and all that the government had to do was pay our salaries.
What happened was that we had an indigestion. We knew it would not last, but
when it did end, we were at a loss” (Zulueta, 1998: 46). Rightly so, among the
benefits the Navy had when the US bases were still around were: the US Military
Assistance Program (USMAP), the equipment hand-me-down program of the US; the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), part of the bases rental fees are channeled back
to the AFP for the purchase of surplus US military hardware or ship repair
packages; use of floating drydock and other facilities; foreign training
programs and technical consultations; and the security blanket for external
threats. (The latter could arguably be considered a benefit since it could also
be because of this dependence, the Philippine Navy never got to prepare to
become an independent and credible navy by the time the Americans left.)

 
THE PRESENT

 

Mission

 

The
Navy today has for its mission ”to conduct prompt and sustained naval
operations in support of the AFP’s mission”. (NOQC Naval Orientation Reference
Handguide, 1997).

 

Functions

 

1.
Provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the

Philippines

and
to protect the people from external threats.

2.
Conduct naval operations in support of air and ground operations.

3.
Conduct maritime law enforcement within the territorial waters and Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).

4. Promote safety of life at sea and environment
protection.

5.
Assist in national development efforts.

 

Organization (see Annex
A)

 

Resources

 

Personnel -   1,687 Officers (see Annex B)

 10,561 EP

Marines
 -   387 Officers

  7,142 EP

 Budget  - P6,014,191,000.00
(see Annex C)

 (Source: GAA 2000)

 Assets - 

 Total  Operating

 

Patrol Ships -
14  3

 Patrol Boats - 35 10

 Transport Ships - 9  4

 Auxiliary Ships - 8  2

 Patrol Craft - 32 17

 Service Craft - 19  9

 

Aircraft:

 Fixed
wing - 9  4

 Rotary   - 5  2

 *Operational
Readiness:

 Ships - 38.5%

 Aircraft - 42.8%

 

Capabilities

 

1. Limited Surface
Warfare

2. Naval Gunfire
Support 

3. Amphibious
Warfare 

4. Sealift
Operations

5. Domestic sea
control

6. Search and Rescue

 

Present Role in Society

 

 The
traditional role of any navy is to obtain “sea control” when necessary. Sea control
is the ability of a fleet to control certain maritime areas (Mahan, 1885) for
whatever purposes it may serve. It involves deployment of naval forces to
engage, destroy or repel enemy naval forces and carries with it the right to
forbid passage through capture or destruction (Agudelo, 1994: 25). While the
Navy can obtain sea control within our territorial waters, it cannot do so
beyond it. This is due to the fact that our fleet could not match-up to any of
our neighbors’ navies. Thus, the Navy today cannot perform its primary mandated
task to provide naval defense to ensure the sovereignty of the Philippines and
protect the people from all external threats. With this, the role of the Navy
has been relegated to conducting internal security operations and maritime law
enforcement. But the Philippines,
with its recognition as an archipelagic state where, according to Zulueta, “the
islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity”, these roles seemed as paramount to the survival
of the state as naval defense. (Zulueta, 1998: 14)

 Internal Security Operations (ISO) involve naval gunfire
support, amphibious and sealift operations. These are defined in an operations
plan and are conducted often in conjunction with air and ground forces. For the
past decades, the Navy had been very active in this role in support of
counter-insurgency operations. On the other hand, Maritime Law Enforcement
(MARLEN) is actually the primary role of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG),
which was separated from the Navy and transferred to the Department of
Transportation and Communication in 1998. However, due to the PCG’s lack of
surface assets and also due to the wide expanse of the Philippine waters that
include the EEZ, the Navy was deputized by various government agencies to
enforce their specific laws. MARLEN involves the conduct of active and passive
patrols to achieve naval presence in areas were illegal activities are
perceived to be rampant.

 While it is a known fact that several Navy ships are of
World War II vintage, most of the boats/crafts that conduct MARLEN operations
are new and acquired only in the mid-90’s. They are highly effective for
coastal patrols being armed with 25 mm cannons and have maximum speeds of 30 knots.

 

FORMS AND LOCI OF CORRUPTION

 

CORRUPTION DEFINED

 

Corruption, according to Sosmena, is “defined as a
dysfunctional and pathological act that negates the accomplishment of its
constitutional mandate of promoting public interest” (Sosmena, 1999: 6). While
according to Klitgaard, “it is the misuse of a public office for personal
gain.” (Sosmena, 1999)

Corruption may be categorized in two ways:
individualized or systemic (Carino, 1985: 15). Individualized corruption is
where a person performs a secret moneymaking act in relation to his duties as
public official or government employee. While systemic corruption is committed
in an agency where, according to Caiden, “corruption has become so regularized
and institutionalized that organizational supports back wrong-doing and
actually penalizes those who live up to the old norms” (Caiden, 1977: 306).
Carino says further, that it is “demonstrated when bureaucrats and clients can
describe the same illegal process, including such details as bribery rates per
service and the way these are shared among the members of the syndicate
throughout the agency. Those with ‘initiative’ and ‘daring’ share the largesse
with their colleagues with less opportunities, thus engulfing everyone in an
administrative culture that tolerates, even idolizes, the fruits of
corruption”. (Carino, 1985: 15)

 

LOCI OF CORRUPTION

 

The loci of corruption in the Navy are found in two
distinct areas: in operational activities, which are ship-based and in
administrative and support activities, which are shore-based. Ship-based
activities include individual Navy ship activities and Naval Task Forces (NTF)
directly involved in naval operations. Shore-based activities, meanwhile,
include operations or functions of the various staff/support units such as personnel,
intelligence, logistics, finance, training, etc. Under these are the various
forms of corruption, which are not necessarily peculiar to each.

 

Ship-based Corruption

 

Direct bribery – “Any public
officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection
with the performance of his duties, in consideration of any offer, promise,
gift or present received by such officer, personally or through mediation of
another…” (Art 210 of the Revised Penal Code 1987)

 

Case
illustration #1

 

On or about 1600H of 07 June 1995, while patrol ship
PS1 was anchored off Sacol Island, Zamboanga while conducting a naval blockade
against Abu Sayyaf Group reportedly hiding on the said island, a medium-sized lancha was sighted suspiciously
steaming nearby. Upon sensing its possible hostile intentions, the crew of PS1
signaled it to come alongside. The lancha
was then inspected and it yielded P11 million worth of smuggled
goods. It was also reported that two
Navy patrol crafts were sighted approaching the lancha but were observed to have reversed their course when the lancha
unintentionally went near PS1.

During interrogation aboard PS1, the master patron
confessed that they were hired to transport the goods from
Sandakan, Malaysia to a designated
place near the coast of Zamboanga City. They
were further instructed to rendezvous with Navy patrol crafts that will escort
them to the drop-off point.

The lancha
and its crew were then apprehended and its goods were confiscated.

* This special “escort” arrangement is common to the
small patrol crafts assigned in Naval Forces South. The personnel assigned in
these crafts are particularly vulnerable to bribes since these are the
workhorses of the fleet that conduct MARLEN patrols. The bribe package includes
a monthly rice and cash incentives for the crew plus repair expenses for the
craft. A utility boy is also provided who also doubles as courier on behalf of
the smuggler.

 

Case
illustration # 2

 

On Aug 1999, a patrol gunboat (PG1) along with three
other patrol crafts received a directive from NTF61 to conduct naval
blockade/MARLEN patrols at designated areas in Sulu Sea
several n.miles off Jolo Is. Also contained in the directive was an
intelligence report stating that there will be an attempt that evening to
smuggle in assorted firearms and explosives to the island. PG1 and the other
crafts then proceeded as ordered and vigilantly kept watch over their
designated areas where the Muslim extremists were supposed to pass as stated in
the directive. The following morning, the PN boats returned to port empty
handed. A few days later, the NTF61 operations officer invited fellow officers
to a drinking spree. There he openly bragged that he just got a payoff
amounting to P100,000.00 from a known big-time smuggler. The payoff was for
letting the smugglers pass through a few nights ago without being apprehended
by ensuring that their sea-lanes were cleared of Navy patrol boats. This he did
by directing all patrol boats to proceed to their designated areas far away
from these sea-lanes.

*It is common knowledge for Naval intelligence
operatives that only small-time smugglers would dare dash their way through the
waters of the South. Their merchandise are often blue seal cigarettes, ukay-ukay or small quantities of
lumber. However, most of them are armed with machine guns and sometimes have
armed escorts. On the other hand, big-time smugglers, pirates and bandits (including the Abu Sayyaf) will never venture
out into the Philippine waters unless they are given “clearance” by the Navy,
Customs and PNP personnel (the Navy mole in these transactions is usually the
operations officer of the NTF). They would not risk losing their valuable
merchandise, which include arms, explosives, drugs and other contraband, to a
crusading Navy captain patrolling the high seas. Another given fact is that the
bulk of the arms supply of the MILF are sea-borne. MILF Commanders use big-time
smugglers as fronts to conduct their transshipment operations. This form of
bribery is also common in Quezon province where illegal logging is rampant and
in the Northern coasts of Luzon where all
forms of smuggling are being conducted. 

 

Extortion a crime
“committed by means of intimidation of persons, that is, by extorting money
from a person. In cases where a law enforcer has apprehended a person
committing a crime and the officer demands money from the culprit as the price
for not arresting or prosecuting him, even if the latter is willing to give
money, there is nevertheless some element of intimidation because of the threat
of impending arrest or prosecution. (Aquino, 1987: 427)

 

Case illustration # 3

 

On or about 1900H of 14 May 1999, the Commanding
Officer (CO) of a patrol gunboat (PG2) assigned in Davao, received an
intelligence report stating that a known smuggler will attempt to smuggle
contraband that evening to the southern coast of Davao. Immediately, PG2 was
off to sea to conduct patrols to intercept the unknown craft. A few hours
later, PG2 picked-up a radar contact a few miles off their position. As the
patrol gunboat approached, the crew noticed that boat was unlighted yet it was
running at a steady speed, an obvious indication of a smuggling activity. PG2
then overtook the suspected smuggling boat and conducted inspection. True
enough, the boat yielded contraband worth at least P2 million. After the
inspection, the patron was invited inside PG2 for interrogation. Present during
the investigation were the CO, Executive Officer (EXO), Chief Master At Arms
(CMAA) and the patron of the boat. Upon being seated in the wardroom, the CO
said to the patron: “Didiretsohin na kita, magbigay ka ng P100,000.00 at
pakakawalan kita.” The patron haggled for a while but eventually agreed. He
then went back to his boat and after a few minutes, returned to PG2. The patron
gave a bag to the CO, who then counted the money inside. Satisfied with the
transaction, the CO ordered the boat to be released. The CO then went inside
his room with the bag in hand.

* This is a classic example of individualized corruption
as defined by Dr Carino. This is often done by the extreme scalawags of the
Navy, which are not few.

 

Fraud Against Government (Pilferage)“Any person subject to military law who steals,
embezzles, knowingly and willfully misappropriates, applies to his own use or
benefit, or wrongfully or knowingly sells or disposes of any ordnance, arms,
equipment, ammunition, clothing, subsistence stores, money, or other property
of the government furnished or intended for the military services thereof.” (Article
of War Nr 95)

 

Case
Illustration # 4

 

On March 1995, the CO of a patrol gunboat PG3 received
a directive from the Naval Task Force 71(NTF71) to conduct MARLEN patrol around
the waters off Saranggani. The CO then re-provisioned and re-fueled to full
tank capacity for the protracted mission. After refueling, PG3 left port.
However, when they were already out at sea, instead of conducting MARLEN
patrols as directed, the CO instructed the crew to moor their patrol boat to a payaw or fish marker. After securing their patrol boat to
the payaw, the CO then ordered
to shut off the engine. During this time, the CO was constantly reporting to
NTF71 that his craft was continuously patrolling the designated area. After
four days of being moored to the payaw,
PG3 went back to port. The CO then reported the negative result of his patrol
to the NTF71 Commander and then made a phone call to a contact. Early morning
the next day, a motor launch went alongside PG3. After a few hours, the motor
launch left but not after siphoning 10,000 liters of fuel saved by PG3 during
the operation and paying the CO P60,000.00 as payment at P6/liter.

 

Case illustration # 5

 

On October 1999, the CO of patrol ship PS2, went to
the Petron Bulk Plant in Cagayan de Oro to make a “special arrangement”
regarding the delivery of fuel to his ship. He wanted Petron to give him
P60,000.00 in cash instead of delivering the 10,000 liters of fuel his ship had
requested. That way, he added, the Petron station would even earn some more
from the transaction. He assured Petron that his ship will receive the “ghost
delivery” accordingly. The CO thought that since he over-declared his ship’s
fuel consumption, he had a fuel savings of 10,000 liters and this would cover
for the “ghost delivery”. Intelligence operatives got wind of the transaction
and an investigation soon followed. When the verdict was out and the
information was confirmed, the unscrupulous CO was “punished” by the
Headquarters by assigning him to another ship of the same category.

*Almost 3 out of 4 Navy vessels engage or have engaged
in these types of malpractice. These occur in all geographical areas of
operation, even in Manila Bay. Some CO’s try to
justify this act by claiming that the money generated goes to ship operations
or for morale and welfare activities. But for most, it is simply to sustain
their high living. Worse, some CO’s sell the fuel to the very same smugglers
they are supposed to apprehend.

 

Shore-based
Corruption

 

Malversation – “Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate
or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other
person to take such public funds, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property…”(Art
217 Revised Penal Code 1987)

 

Case
illustration # 6

 

In 1999, patrol gunboat PG4 underwent major repairs
that had a budget cost of cost P50 million. While the vessel was drydocked in
Navotas, the Executive Officer found out that the steel plates placed on the
hull were below the specifications stated in the work order. He then reviewed
the other areas of the work package and discovered that most of the spare parts
being installed during the overhauling of the main engines were used ones
coming from another gunboat of the same class that had been mothballed. Thus,
when he computed the actual cost incurred by the contractor, the total repair
package should have been only P5 million. The EXO then went to the Headquarters
to complain about the repair irregularities and the grossly overpriced
contract; he was surprised to find out that the repair had already been accepted
by the Technical Inspection and Acceptance Committee six months before, which
means that the contractor had already been paid even while the repair was still
unfinished. Six months later, PG4 completely bogged down right after a send-off
ceremony for deployment. It is now programmed for another major repair.

 

Case
illustration # 7 

 

On 22 December 1999 during the Command Christmas
Party, the Commander of the Philippine Fleet distributed P450.00 each to all
the personnel in his Command (For a total number of personnel at above 4,000,
this would compute to roughly P2 million). Then on January 2000, the Patrol
Force (a major unit of Philippine Fleet) prepared documents for the “ghost
repair” of an already operational patrol gunboat amounting to P3 million
apparently as payment for the cash advanced by a favored dealer during the said
Christmas party.

* Case illustrations # 6 and 7 will show why only 38%
of the total naval assets are operational. For the Navy top brass to say that
the Navy has few patrol boats is because of their own undoing. Had these funds
for repair (almost P350 million in the present budget) been used properly all
these years, there would have been more ships to patrol our waters. A patrol
boat with a speed of 20 knots is capable of patrolling an area of almost 3,000
sq n.mi. in a ten-hour patrol. Several boats positioned properly, could project
a Naval presence in the vast Philippine waters that could effectively deter
outlaws.

 

Case illustration # 8

 

The Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for
Personnel, O-N1, among other functions, is the staff in charge of personnel
accounting. It listed the total number of active military personnel (officers
and EP) at 19,714. This total excludes those assigned at the General
Headquarters (GHQ). On the other hand, the Philippine Navy Finance Center
(PNFC) is the unit in charge of providing the pay and allowances of personnel.
In the PNFC list, the total number of personnel (excluding those assigned in
GHQ since their salaries are handled by the AFP Finance Center) is 20,496 or 782
more than O-N1’s total. Simply put, the Navy is paying an additional 782
personnel whose whereabouts are unknown.

*These “ghost personnel” came from those who have left
the service through attrition, AWOL, retirement, death, etc., and have not been
dropped deliberately from the payroll.

 

Case illustration # 9

 

All officers assigned in the Headquarters of the
Philippine Navy (HPN) get an average of P3,000.00 each monthly as “incentive pay”.
To afford this, the HPN prepares documents for “ghost deliveries” also known as
“conversion”. At 193 officers, this would amount to almost P600,000.00 a month.

*This is done in almost all major units that have the
authority to procure. Other variations of this are over-pricing, under delivery
and substitution. This is easily done because of collusion between dealers and
all those involved in the procurement process. The COA Auditors give a blind
eye to these irregularities because they receive commissions equivalent to 1-2
percent of the total amount in the purchase orders. A PCIJ report further
states that: “After 1991, negotiated deals became the norm, with the AFP going
straight to the President for whatever big purchase it wants to make. Nearly
all these deals turned disadvantageous- if not downright disastrous- to troops
in the end…officers say that corruption has become so pervasive in the AFP that
the crooks in their midst have evolved a vocabulary of their own. For instance,
one colonel said, ‘cost of money’ means ’the amount a proponent pays to
facilitators for making his dreams come true’. ’Cleared money’, meanwhile, is
‘money (procurement budget) that has been converted (to other uses), which one
could spend anywhere.’ Put another way, it is ‘laundered money’, he said.
Contractors for their part said that the evolving consensus among them is that
some service commands are more corrupt than others. Their integrity meter puts
the Army on top, followed by General Headquarters, and then the Navy. The Air
Force ranks last, they said, for allegedly being the most corrupt.” Overpricing
“in the Navy is about 100 to 200 percent.”(Mangahas, 2001)

 

EFFECTS
ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The direct effects of
corruption in the Navy on national development are staggering. It affects the
economy through the systemic rape of the funds entrusted to it. These include
losses from the ghost payroll, ghost repairs, ghost deliveries/conversion,
pilferage of fuel, overpriced purchases, etc.

Indirectly, the
effects are so much worse. According to Tangco: “Smugglers, poachers and
pirates rob the economy of billions in lost revenue and taxes, ultimately
sapping the strength of local industries and commerce and often times
inflicting serious damage on the natural environment.”(Tangco, 1998: 177) 

Then “Senator Orlando
Mercado, who chairs the Senate Committee on national defense and security,
estimates that around 600,000.00 metric tons of fish worth an astounding P50
billion are lost annually due to poaching by foreign fishing vessels.” (Tangco,
1998: 177) 

Even more alarming is
its indirect effect on national security. Thousands of people have already died
in the decades-old secessionist war even as the government continue to spend
billions trying to contain secessionists and bandits on the ground, when they
could have been greatly weakened simply by a sustained naval presence. The
existence of the MILF is hinged on its unimpeded supply lines from sympathetic
countries that pass through sea-lanes wittingly provided by the Navy primarily
because of corruption.

As for the Abu
Sayyaf, while it may be true that they have fast kumpits, these boats are still detectable by radar and would not
last long in a hot pursuit. Besides, they are not known to go island hopping if
they knew that there were Navy boats patrolling the high seas.

 

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

 

 The prospects for the future of the Navy have been
defined by two recent events: The success story that happened at the Naval
Education and Training Command (NETC) in 2000 and the PN leadership crisis on
February 2001 which involved RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP and the Philippine
Marines.

 The NETC is the training arm of the
Navy. It is responsible for the conduct of basic, advanced and specialization
courses for officers and enlisted personnel. Since NETC is technically a
school, bulk of its purchases are for uniforms and accessories; school/office
supplies; and training materials. With an annual budget of P169 million (P121M
for salaries and P48 M for supplies, based on the NETC OPB for CY – 2000), the
NETC had become the object of larceny by previous Commanders, which resulted to
the corrosion of the whole training system of the Navy.

On
December 1999, Commodore Ruben G Domingo AFP assumed as Commander of NETC.
Knowing the dark history of his unit and the tasks at hand, he immediately set
into motion a reform program centered into the cleansing of the procurement
system. And the result was astounding. In one year, the NETC, not only
accomplished its mission of conducting all programmed courses, it had also
accumulated P5 million worth of savings. These savings were then used to
improve other training facilities and equipment. The complete eradication of
corruption was achieved. He did this, first, by removing suspected scalawags
from staff positions then replacing them with officers whom he perceived to be
still unstained by the grime of corruption. Then, Commo Domingo simply
instructed everyone to do things “by the book”. Particularly, the religious and
transparent implementation of canvassing and bidding procedures of procurement
set forth by existing laws and guidelines. No “conversion” or “substitution”
was allowed. As a safety net, he involved the Intelligence division to monitor
the process and set up entrapment operations whenever necessary.

Surprisingly,
Commo Domingo’s reform program did not resemble the “radical redesigning”
concept of Reengineering (Hammer, 1993), the “entrepreneurial government”
spirit espoused by the Reinventing Government (Osborne, 1990) nor was it a form
of “Neo-Taylorism” (Reyes 1998, 189). Its only main components were his
technical competence, moral integrity and political will as a Commander;
specifically, the technical competence to formulate reforms, and the moral
integrity and political will to enforce them.

On
December 2000, when RAdm Guillermo G Wong AFP assumed as
Flag-Officer-In-Command (FOIC) of the Philippine Navy everybody in the Navy
expected radical changes. RAdm Wong, who had a reputation of being
incorruptible, had envisioned a totally corrupt-free Navy. Upon assumption, he
went on a “crusading mode” by “going to several places trying to clean up the
Navy” (Pazzibugan, 2001). On February 2001, the Navy (and the AFP) was rocked
by a leadership crisis when the Philippine Marines demanded the relief of the
RAdm Wong (Pazzibugan, 2001). The crisis was triggered by the berating of the
Marines by RAdm Wong for alleged irregularities in the procurement of P3.8
million worth of Kevlar Helmets (Pablo, 2001). In the events that followed,
President Arroyo left the crisis to be resolved by then AFP Chief of Staff Gen
Angelo Reyes (Pablo, 2001), who offered Wong the command of the newly formed
Northern Command as a concession for his being relieved as FOIC. RAdm Wong,
realizing that this was a demotion, opted to resign (Pazzibugan, 2001). Later
on Pres Arroyo was “asked if she was satisfied with the way Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Gen Angelo Reyes had handled the conflict between Wong and the Marine
Corps, The President said Reyes had done the right thing.” (Pablo, 2001). RAdm
Wong was eventually replaced by RAdm Hingco, whose policy was to disregard all
reforms initiated by his predecessor and revert to the previous status quo.

For
a President and Commander-in-Chief, whose government was supposed to be founded
on such slogans as “New Politics”, moral regeneration and good governance, to
say that what Gen Reyes did was the right thing was truly demoralizing to say
the least. This was the first indication of the type of leadership the AFP will
expect from its Commander-in-Chief. RAdm Wong should have been fully backed by
his Chief of Staff and his Commander-in-Chief as he was on the right and
principled side. More importantly, he was the foremost practitioner of good
governance and, certainly, someone who has both the moral ascendancy and
political will to effect change in the Navy. Unfortunately, according to the
“New Politics” philosophy of Pres.Arroyo, this is not so.

The two events narrated symbolize both hope and
despair. Hope in that there is still a chance for the Navy to get out of the
hole its officers and former officers had created. And despair at the thought
that this chance is reliant on a politics-administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887), which was
best described by Dr Danilo R Reyes in one of his lectures as a mere
“pretender” paradigm.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The
corruption problem in the Philippine Navy is grave. The direct and indirect
damages to our economy, national security and peace and order in terms of costs
and lives lost had been devastating and continue to be so. Thus, impeding our
efforts on national development.

The
obsolescence and shortage of operating assets of the Navy’s fleet are not the
reasons for its ineffectiveness but they are the results of years of
malversation of funds. But ill-equipped as it is, the Navy is still very
capable of ISO and MARLEN operations if only there are CO’s and officers who
have enough moral decency to be faithful to their mandated tasks.

The
corruption had become systemic and had eaten through the very core of the
organization and had infected, practically, all levels of the bureaucracy and
all areas of operation.

The
future of the Navy is clouded by mixed insights. On one hand, the success of
the NETC model was a ray of light amidst the darkness of moral decadence. It
proved that total eradication of corruption in a major unit in the Navy is
possible. The next step is magnifying this accomplishment to a higher plane,
the Philippine Navy Command itself. More importantly, it showed how it could be
done simply through the Commander’s political will with moral integrity and
technical competence as primary requisites.

On
the other hand, however, this will only be possible if the next crusading
Flag-Officer-In-Command would be fully supported by a Commander-in-Chief who
possesses strong leadership qualities and who would not allow political
concessions and political indebtedness be the bases of his/her decision-making
as regards AFP matters. This way, the whole AFP Officer Corps will not get the
impression that they are being treated as an organization of untouchables who
can get away with anything.

 

 

REFERENCES

 

Agudelo,
Jose T.

1994 Naval Requirements of an Archipelagic State.
Philippine Military Digest Vol 1 Nr 1. (January-March)

 

Aquino, Ramon C.

1987 The Revised Penal Code Vol I & II. 1987 Edition.

Manila

: Central Book Supply Inc

 

Caiden,
Gerald and Naomi

1977 Administrative Corruption. As quoted
in Carino, Ledivina V. The
Politicization of the Philippine Bureaucracy: Corruption or Commitment?
International
Review of Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public
Administrations No.1 1985.

 

Carino,
Ledivina V.

1985 The Politicization of the Philippine
Bureaucracy: Corruption or Commitment?
International Review of
Administrative Sciences: A Journal of Comparative Public Administrations No.1
1985.

 

Giagonia,
Regino

1997 The Philippine Navy (1898-1996) 2nd Edition.

Manila

: Philippine Navy

 

Hammer,
Michael and James Champy

1993 As printed in Arie Halachmi. Re-engineering
and public management: some issues and considerations
.

London

,

England

:
Sage Publications Ltd. 1995

 

Mahan,
Alfred T.

1885 As reprinted in John B
Hattendorf ed. Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the writings of Rear
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan
.

Annapolis

,

Maryland

: Naval Institute Press.
1991

 

Mangahas,
Malou C.

2001 Kickbacks and Negotiated Deals Mar AFP Procurement System
(Corruption-free modernization?).
A PCIJ Report downloaded from PCIJ
website at www. PCIJ. org

 

Osborne,
David and Ted Gaebler

1992 Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector from School House to
Statehouse, City Hall to Pentagon
.

Reading

MA

: Addison-Wesley

 

Pazzibugan,
Dona

2001 Golez: Military row inevitable given Wong’s ‘crusading mode’. Philippine
Daily Inquirer
. Feb 28

 

Pablo,
Carlito and Armando Nocum

2001 AFP turmoil worsens. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb 27

2001 Wong links Biazon to mess. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Feb
28

 

Reyes,
Danilo R.

1998 Public Sector Reengineering: Practice,
Problems and Prospects. Philippine Journal of Public Administration Vol.
XLII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July – October)

 

Sosmena,
Gaudioso

1999 Concept of Bureaucratic Sedition. Vol II No.6. NDCP
Occasional paper

 

Tangco,
Ruben and Sev Sarmenta

1998 The Continuing Quest for Relevance in Ruben v. Tangco ,ed. Tides of
Change: The Philippine Navy Looks Back A Hundred Years And Peers Into The Next
Century
.

Manila

:
Philippine Navy through Infinit-I Communication Services

 

Wilson,
Woodrow

1887 as reprinted in Dwight Waldo ed. Ideas
and Issues in Public Administration
.

New
  York

: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc. 1953

 

Zulueta,
Joselito

1999 Archipelagic Riddle. As quoted in Ruben v. Tangco ,ed. Tides of
Change: The Philippine Navy Looks Back A Hundred Years And Peers Into The Next
Century
.

Manila

:
Philippine Navy through Infinit-I Communication Services

 

1938 Articles of War as printed in A Manual for Courts-Martial
Armed Forces of the

Philippines

.
1987 Edition

 

1997 NOQC
Naval Orientation Reference Handguide

 

2000 Gen Appropriations Act. Downloaded from DBM website at www. DBM.gov.ph

 

2001 Joint Army, Navy, Air Force task force tracking kidnappers. Philippine
Daily Inquirer
. May 27

 

2001 Growing
Evidence Abu Sayyaf behind Kidnappings: Tiglao. Philippine Daily Inquirer.
May 28

 

2001 No proof
of hostages in Sulu, Basilan: military spokesperson. Philippine Daily
Inquirer
. May 31

My Proposed Legislative Program

December 20th, 2006 by sonnytrillanes4

MY PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

 

ANTI-CORRUPTION

 

· A bill
that would reengineer government processes to reduce bureaucratic red tape and
minimize the points of contact between the public official and client. This
would hasten business transactions, encourage economic activities and minimize
opportunities for bribery and extortion practices.

 

· A bill
that would overhaul and rationalize the auditing processes of the Commission on
Audit (COA) to make it more effective as an anti-corruption watchdog.

 

· A bill
providing for a new and more comprehensive “Anti-Graft
and Corruption Practices Act”
that would promote accountability and
transparency in public service(e.g. all public officials shall sign a waiver of their rights under the Bank Secrecy Law) and governance and would increase to the maximum
possible extent the administrative and criminal liabilities of corrupt
government officials.

 

· A bill
that would provide for automatic and periodic wage review and increase for all
government employees, which would be based on the inflation rate within every
3-year period. This is a proven effective anti-corruption policy employed by
other countries. It also intends to
provide for a decent standard of living for all government employees as well as
to attract qualified people from the private sector to join government.

 

 

ANTI-POVERTY

 

· A bill
creating a permanent anti-poverty commission with tenured leadership with
automatic, adequate and independent funding that would draft and implement
strategic, long-term and comprehensive anti-poverty and poverty alleviation
programs of the Government.

 

· A bill
providing for a comprehensive school-based feeding program in the ‘poorest of
the poor’ communities of the country to fight malnutrition and poverty as well
as help promote and encourage regular school attendance by poor school
children.

 

· A bill
that would promote and fund microfinance to provide small and medium
enterprises, cooperatives and micro entrepreneurs with adequate and affordable
credit. This would encourage economic activities and create income and
employment for the poor.

 

 

PEACE
& ORDER

 

· A bill
that would define the peace & order policy of the country.

 

· A new
AFP modernization bill that is more responsive to the needs of the organization
and of the nation and which would create a leaner but more effective Armed
Forces.

 

· A
resolution that would recommend the amendments of the constitutional provision
requiring all AFP officers for promotion to the rank of colonel or higher, to
go through the Commission of Appointments. Instead, only the promotions for the
positions of AFP Chief of Staff and the three (3) service commanders would pass
through the CA. This would insulate senior officers from members of Congress
who seek political accommodations and concessions in exchange for confirmation.
Also included in this resolution is the fixing of the term of office of the AFP
chief of staff and the major service commanders to three (3) years. This would
prevent the internal politics among generals caused by the ‘revolving door’ policy employed by the past and present
administrations; help restore meritocracy in the AFP promotion system; and
ensure that policies and reforms are institutionalized.

 

· A bill
that would reduce the number of AFP generals. This would significantly
streamline the organization and free up more resources that could be
re-channeled to operating units; for materiel acquisition; and morale and
welfare needs.

 

· A bill
that would provide for a complete reorganization, re-training and
re-indoctrination of the PNP. This intends to professionalize its ranks to make
it a better law enforcement arm of the State.

 

 

EDUCATION,
HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES

 

· A bill
that would create at least one (1) state college or university in every region
to afford poor but deserving students adequate opportunities to finish tertiary
education.

 

· A bill
that would make college education more accessible to the poor by strengthening
and providing more funds to the state scholarship system and to the ‘study now,
pay later’ program of the Government.

 

· A bill
that would promote, as well as regulate informal education, vocational and
technical education as well as distance learning methods.

 

· A bill
that would raise the salaries and wages of public school teachers, professors
and lecturers of state colleges and universities to a level befitting the
dignity of their exalted professions.

 

· A bill
which would provide for the creation and/or strengthening of health centers in
every barangay with adequate funding in order to provide basic health care
services (including mandatory inoculation) as well as health education with
emphasis on disease prevention, detection and control, pre-natal and child care
and basic family planning education (with due regard to religious belief of the
participants).

 

· Through
the General Appropriations bill, prioritize and allocate more funds and
resources for education (textbooks, school buildings, subsidy of state
colleges, and hiring of more teachers), anti-poverty programs (MBN-type
programs, livelihood projects, street children education and rehabilitation),
health care (medicine, vaccinations, disease control and prevention,
reproductive health, home for the aged/disabled), mass housing, basic
infrastructure (farm-to-market roads, national highways, bridges, ports and
airports) and agricultural modernization.

 

Armed Forces

 

· A Bill
     that would increase the salaries of all AFP personnel to a level befitting
     their noble service to the country

· A bill
     that would increase the subsistence allowance of all AFP personnel from
     P60.00/day to at least P150/day

· A bill
     that would increase the subsistence allowance of all AFP personnel from
     P60.00/day to at least P150/day

The Greenbase Expose

December 4th, 2006 by sonnytrillanes4

The

GREENBASE EXPOSÉ

 

LTSG ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES IV PN

October 2003

 

 

“The prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people.”

 

- 1987 Constitution of the Republic of
the

Philippines

 

 

 

 

 

THE OAKWOOD INCIDENT

 

On the early morning of July 27, 2003, a
group of soldiers occupied the Oakwood Hotel in

Makati

to conduct protest actions against the
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo Administration. Among the grievances they voiced out
was GMA’s alleged responsibility for the

Davao

bombing incidents.

In the investigations that followed, the
soldiers admitted that the ultimate sources of their information are the
so-called Greenbase Documents. How true are these documents? What exactly is
OPLAN GREENBASE all about? Indeed, what did these documents contain that were
serious enough to drive these soldiers to rise against their very own
Commander-in-Chief? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions never came as
the investigations focused more on the peripheral issues such as armbands and
on whether the soldiers’ actions were spontaneous or not. Eventually, the
Greenbase issue was buried and forgotten.

Until now…

 

GMA’s PEACE POLICY

 

Upon assumption to power, GMA adopted an
all-out peace policy for all the different rebel and secessionist groups. This
was articulated in her own Executive Order #3 signed on 28 Feb 2001 entitled
“Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for Government’s Comprehensive
Peace Efforts” (see Annex A) where a comprehensive peace process provided a
holistic framework in addressing the long-running insurgency and secessionism
in the country.

Likewise, in her Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan 2001-2004, she stressed that the vision for sustained peace
and development in

Mindanao

is the peaceful
coexistence of all stakeholders. “It
outlined the challenges to be addressed such as: preventing the recurrence of
armed conflict; addressing cultural inequity as manifested in the loss of
ancestral lands and non-consideration of cultural aspects in programs and projects,
and in addressing political inequity through the full implementation of
autonomy, increased representation in government of Muslims and lumads, and
improved conflict resolution and negotiation mechanisms
.” (Relief, Rehab
efforts intensified in Mindanao
, Manila Times, 19 June 01).

As regards peace efforts with the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), confidence-building measures complemented
these peace policy declarations. On 20 Feb 2001, GMA announced the suspension
of offensive military operations (SOMO) with the MILF. A few days later, then
Justice Secretary Perez said that the multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder charges against the MILF leaders would be returned to the DOJ for
reinvestigation. (Raps vs MILF leaders dropped. Inquirer News Service.
24 Feb 01). Then on March 16, NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco announced that the
Rizal Day bombing was not the handiwork of the MILF. (Rizal Day attacks, NBI
clears MILF on bombings
. PDI. 17 Mar 01).

On 24 March 2001, the Agreement on the
General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks is signed by the GRP and
MILF panels in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (State of the Nation Address (SONA) 2003
Technical Report). This paved the way for the MILF’s suspension of all
offensive military action in their areas of operation on 03 April 2001.

The first round of formal Peace Talks
were held in Tripoli, Libya on 22 June 2001 where both panels signed the
Agreement on Peace between the GRP and the MILF. The second round was held on
07 August 2001 that resulted to the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on
the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF. Then on 18 October 2001, the third round
of Peace Talks was held in Kuala Lumpur where both panels signed the Manual of
Instruction for the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and
the local Monitoring Teams. (SONA 2003 Technical Report).

In the ensuing months, while there were
still some minor clashes between the AFP and the MILF, the peace talks seemed
to be holding. Which led GMA to say that “the sincerity of the MILF top command
to join the mainstream and let their people share whatever development there
can be is really very, very clear.” (Presidential News Desk News Release No. 7,
27 Feb 02). For a while it seemed that the ever-elusive peace in Mindanao is
finally at hand.

But in early February 2003, AFP
operations were stepped up in Central Mindanao incurring heavy losses on the
side of the MILF. The AFP said that the reason for the attack was to dismantle
two new MILF camps. (Abaya: MILF suffers heavy casualties in Mindanao
operations
. Froilan Gallardo. inq7.net. 05 Feb 03). Then on Feb 11, the
Army’s 6th Infantry (K) Division launched a full-scale attack on the
Buliok Complex in the Liguasan Marsh Area in Pikit, North Cotabato. (The
Fall of Buliok Complex – 6ID
. 03 Mar 03. Downloaded from www.army.mil.ph).
Suddenly, the government is again at war with the MILF.

 

BULIOK OFFENSIVE’S
RATIONALE

 

In justifying the renewed attacks,
Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas Ople said “the AFP units entered this area by
the Liguasan Marsh for only one purpose: to apprehend the criminal elements of
the notorious Pentagon Gang that had fled to the Buliok Complex, seeking
sanctuary in the MILF camps.” (Statement of Sec. Blas Ople in a briefing for
OIC Ambassador, DFA. 19 Feb 03). Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes meanwhile said
that the AFP was “in hot pursuit of certain lawless elements, principally the
kidnap-for-ransom groups and people responsible in the bombing last December
24.” (Tension up in North Cotabato ahead of troops-MILF clash. Froilan
Gallardo. inq7.net. 10 Feb 03).

Could these be the real reasons for
launching a full-scale war with the 10,000-strong MILF and negating all the
milestone achievements in the peace talks? Just so that a band of 100
kidnappers could be apprehended? Or, the hot pursuit of lawless elements who
committed a crime more than a month before?

But then again, Sec. Reyes himself
acknowledged before the Congressional Oversight Committee on the VFA, which was
studying the feasibility of holding RP-US war games in Sulu, that “he was
uncertain if those killed during the Buliok operations were Pentagon Gang
members or Muslim guerrillas.” Asked further if the mission was accomplished?
All Sec. Reyes could answer were “I don’t know” or “I cannot recall” responses,
which disappointed Senators Biazon, Pimentel and Angara. Sen. Biazon even
commented, “I think the Defense Secretary is trying to evade responsibility for
the Mindanao problem.” (Reyes comes under fire for ordering the Buliok
offensive.
Joshua Dancel. Manila Times. 12 Mar 03)

Now, if the official reason for the
Buliok operations given by the government is not true, then what is? What could
have motivated GMA to turn her back on her own peace initiatives and plunge her
country and people into a war that would eventually kill hundreds of people,
injuring thousands more and displacing at least 300,000 civilians?

 

THE
GREENBASE DOCUMENTS

 

 The Greenbase
Documents are actually photocopies of what appeared to be two official
Malacañang documents. The first is a Memorandum of Instructions dated 11 Feb
2003 addressed to then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and purportedly signed by
GMA. (see Annex B). The second is purportedly signed by then Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process Eduardo Ermita and is entitled “The President’s
Four-Point Policy Framework in Addressing the Southern Philippine
Secessionists/MILF Problem (Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of
Instructions approved on 11 Feb 2003) (see Annex C). Both documents were leaked
sometime in February 2003 right after the start of the Buliok Complex
offensive.

The Memorandum of Instruction (MOI)
authorized the implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, which is basically an action
plan to capture and occupy the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh Area.
The reason for the clearing operations is to enable the NEDA to implement the
25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan and the revival of the
Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between Philippine National Oil
Company-Exploration Corporation and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd. Another
objective of the plan according to the MOI is to capture MILF Chairman Salamat
Hashim dead or alive. Also, the MOI explicitly stated that all matters
pertinent to OPLAN GREENBASE should be coordinated with the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process and the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns.

The Four-Point Policy Framework (FPPF)
meanwhile, detailed and expanded OPLAN GREENBASE into an action plan that would
operationalize the approved MOI of GMA. The action plan is broken down into a
four-point policy framework.

The first point provided the guidelines
for the capture and occupation of the Buliok Complex and the capture of MILF
Chairman Salamat Hashim.

The second point explicitly stated that
the Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities has been suspended
indefinitely. Moreover, the government will set up a monitoring team to absorb
the duties and functions of the yet to be formed, OIC monitoring team.

The third point is about the government’s
intention to invoke its right for the MILF to observe the May 6 joint
communiqué where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking refuge
in these controlled areas. It also states that once the Liguasan Marsh is
cleared of the MILF, the Liguasan Marsh Development Plan, the Farm-In Agreement
and Joint Operating Agreement between PNOC-EC and Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and
the Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur palm oil project could be implemented.

The fourth point, however, is the most
controversial part of the whole document. In its entirety it states:

“The
MILF must be held responsible for the AFP-backed spate of bombing in urban
areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission towers, power
sub-stations and barges, the Mt. Apo Geothermal Power Plant, the Pulangi Power
Plant, and power plants of electric cooperatives and companies in Mindanao.
Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition, multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder will be filed against MILF leaders in various courts in order
to secure warrants of arrest against them and reduce them in estoppel.

“The
AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over print and broadcast
media, and destabilizations in urban Christian areas, such as Davao International
Airport, Awang Airport, Gen Santos City International Standard Airport,
Zamboanga International Airport, Cagayan de Oro Airport, principal ports and
wharves, foreign embassies and consulates, hotels and restaurants, shopping
malls, hospitals, churches, public markets and terminals, radio and television
stations, factories, oil depots and gasoline stations, buses, cinemas, schools,
plazas and others must be intensified and thereafter put the blame on the MILF
so as to convince the Asean, the European Union, and the United States’ State
Department to formally declare the MILF as a FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION and
Chairman Hashim Salamat as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist because of
the gravity and magnitude of threat he and the MILF pose on the national
security and territorial integrity of the Philippines and Asean Countries.
Hashim’s capture or death, and MILF’s designation as an FTO will ensure the
smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao and the US troops’ planned
basing in Sarangani-Gen. Santos City.”

 

PROPAGANDA or ACTION PLAN?

 

The assertions of the GMA Administration
against the Greenbase documents were articulated by Presidential Spokesperson
Ignacio Bunye when he said in a press briefing on 27 Feb 2003, “We’d like to
state that this document is spurious. It is not true. This document is fake and
it has been circulated probably to agitate the Muslim population in Mindanao.”
(Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph).
On the other hand, the claim of the protesting soldiers in Oakwood was that the
OPLAN GREENDBASE contained in the documents was an action plan authorized by
GMA herself and executed by different government agencies.

Since a spurious or propaganda material
is supposed to contain false information while an action plan is based on true
information, instructions or guidelines for action that will be acted upon,
then to authenticate the documents, or more specifically the contents thereof,
they would have to be subjected to a single evaluation criterion, FACTS. These
facts may come in the form of official pronouncements by government officials
or by GMA herself or actual events that occurred that would validate or
invalidate specific statements contained in the Greenbase Documents.

The following are the findings:

 

Memorandum of Instructions (MOI)

 

1.  MOI  -
 In para 2 it states that “the AFP must CAPTURE AND OCCUPY
simultaneously within one week the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan Marsh
Area…”

Findings
-  On Feb 12, GMA declared: “I
order the AFP to capture and occupy the Buliok Complex fronting the Liguasan
Marsh Area…” (PND News Release. 12 Feb 03). This statement is not only very
similar to what was written in the MOI but it also coincides with the date
written on the document, which is February 11, 2003.

 - On Feb 11, the Philippine Army’s 6th Infantry
(K) Division launched an offensive in the Liguasan Marsh Area, particularly the
Buliok Complex (The Fall of Buliok Complex – 6ID. Downloaded from www.army.mil.ph,
03 Mar 03).

2.  MOI -
 In para 1 it states, “I order that the OPLAN GREENBASE must be
totally implemented without prejudice to the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of
Peace.”

 Finding -
 The GRP-MILF Agreement of Peace
was signed by both peace panels on 22 June 2001 in Tripoli, Libya. (SONA 2003
Technical Report)

3.  MOI -
 In para 2 it states, “the GRP-MILF Agreements on the General
Cessation of Hostilities is hereby suspended indefinitely.”

 Finding -
 The GRP-MILF Agreement on the
General Cessation of Hostilities was signed on 18 July 1997 with the Manual of
Instructions signed on 18 October 2001. (SONA 2003 Technical Report). This was
unilaterally suspended when the AFP launched a full-scale attack on the Buliok
Complex.

4.  MOI -
 In para 2 it states, “the Buliok Complex has been identified by
the Southcom as the base of operations and refuge area of the notorious
Pentagon kidnap-for-ransom group and other heavily armed criminal groups in
Mindanao.”

 Finding -
 On Feb 12, GMA said: “The Buliok
Complex has been identified as the base of operations and refuge area of the
notorious Pentagon kidnapping gang and other heavily armed criminal groups in
Mindanao.” (PND News Release, 12 Feb 03). This statement is almost identical to
what is stated in the MOI.

5.  MOI -
 In para 2 it states, “…Buliok Complex where Salamat Hashim’s
headquarters ‘Islamic Center’ is located.”

 Finding -
 The Islamic Center Mansion of
Salamat Hashim is located inside Buliok Complex, which was seized by government
troops on 16 Feb 2003. (Gov’t troops take over “Mansion” of TOP MILF leader.
PDI. 17 Feb 03)

6. MOI - In para 3 it states, “I have instructed the Department of Energy
Secretary to revive the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract (Cotabato
Basin Exploration Project) between Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd and the Philippine
National Oil Company-Exploration Corporation as the draft Farm-In Agreement and
Joint Operating Agreement between the PNOC and Petronas are ready for signing.”

 Finding - According to PNOC-EC records, the
PNOC-EC and the Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd (PCOSB) entered into a joint
agreement to explore the 1,044,000-hectare Cotabato Basin on 29 April 1995. The
contract was pursuant to the Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract and the
pre-negotiated service contract dated 10 May 1994 between the Department of
Energy and PNOC-EC. However, in 1997, this contract was pre-terminated by PCOSB
for security reasons since 5 PCOSB project team members were kidnapped.

7. MOI - In para 4 it states, “I have further ordered the NEDA
Director-General to implement the much delayed 25-year Liguasan Marsh
Development Framework Plan…”

 Finding - There is a NEDA project entitled
“LIGUASAN MARSH DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN 1999-2025.” As of the present, the
project implementation is delayed by 4 years.

8. MOI - In para 5 it states, “serve the warrants of arrest issued against
Samier Hashim, Ustaz Salamat Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Eid Kabalu by
various courts two years ago.”

 Finding - There were warrants of arrest for top
MILF leaders for the charges of multiple murder, frustrated multiple murder and
these were given back to the DOJ two years ago for reinvestigation. (Raps
vs. MILF leaders dropped
. Inquirer News Service, 24 Feb 01)

9.  MOI - In para 6 it states, “In implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Anti-Poverty
Commission (NAPC), and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) must
ensure that all evacuees in the war-affected barangays of Cotabato, Maguindanao
and Sultan Kudarat provinces are orderly evacuated…”

 Findings - On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting
with members of the Malacañang Press Corps, said: “I order Social Welfare and
Development Secretary Corazon Juliano-Soliman and National Anti-Poverty
Commission Secretary Teresita Deles to visit the area and make sure that the
needs of the residents of the area, especially the evacuees, are met.”
(Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 - The NDCC gave P5
million to Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Piñol to fund a development plan for
displaced families. (GMA asks Pikit Folk: have faith in gov’t. 02 Jul
03. Downloaded from www.pia.gov.ph)

10.
MOI - In para 7 it states, “It
is desired that all matters pertinent hereto shall be fully coordinated with
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the Presidential Adviser for
Special Concerns.”

 Findings - On Feb 19, in the State Dining Room
in Malacañang, GMA said: “I’ve appointed my Secretary for the Peace Process,
Secretary Ed Ermita, to be my action officer for my Administration’s
comprehensive peace and development efforts in the Liguasan Marsh Area.”
(Downloaded from www.ops.gov.ph)

 - On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting with members of the
Malacañang Press Corps said: “I also sent Presidential Adviser on Special
Concerns Norberto Gonzales to initiate talks regarding the peace process with
MILF peace panel in Kuala Lumpur.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 

The
Four-Point Policy Framework (FPPF)

 

1. FPPF - In para 1 it states, “the AFP must capture and occupy Buliok
Complex and environs within a week of continuous, massive aerial and infantry
attacks…”

 Finding - On Feb 28, GMA, in an interview with
Malacañang reporters in Camp General Mateo Capinpin, Tanay, Rizal, said: “I
strongly believe in the capability of the military to follow deadlines that I
have been giving them. When I told them to capture Buliok Complex in three
days, the Armed Forces completed their mission before my deadline.” (Downloaded
from www.op.gov.ph)

 - The AFP captured the whole Buliok Complex on 15 Feb 03. (Pikit
fighting subsides: Military captures MILF stronghold in Cotabato
. Inquirer
News Service. 10 Feb 03)

2. FPPF - In para 1 it states, “The government’s high-value target in the
implementation of OPLAN Greenbase is to CAPTURE MILF HASHIM SALAMAT DEAD OR ALIVE.”

 Finding - On August 5, MILF Chairman Hashim
Salamat was pronounced dead* by MILF Spokesperson Eid Kabalu. He said that
Salamat died of cardiac arrest last 13 July 2003. (OFFICIAL: DEATH of MILF
chair won’t stall peace talks.
PDI. 06 Aug 03)

 *  It was not explained by Eid Kabalu why
the MILF delayed the announcement of Chairman Salamat’s death. Maybe they were
only forced to announce his death since the peace talks were about to resume
and they had earlier announced that Chairman Salamat was willing to act as
Chief Negotiator. Whether he actually died during the Buliok operations but was
kept secret at that time to avoid a breakdown in the MILF command structure as
well as the morale of their fighters, or he truly died of cardiac arrest as
officially pronounced, would never be known.

3. FPPF - In para 1 it states “With the capture of all MILF camps, the
Government, with the active participation of the Local government units in the
area, must establish an Area of Temporary Stay (ATS) where the MILF rebels and
their surviving leaders can be concentrated to avoid “mis-encounters” while
negotiations for their total capitulation are going on.”

 Finding - One of the talking points during the
March 01 meeting of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security
(COCIS) was to “establish an Area of Temporary Stay (ATS) for MILF rebels to
avoid ‘mis-encounters’ while negotiations are going on.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt
plan for peace with MILF.
Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar
03)

4. FPPF - In para 2 it states, “the Government will set up an acceptable
monitoring team composed of PNP and AFP officials to monitor effectively any
ceasefire mechanism that could be devised by the Defense Department.”

 Finding - One of the talking points during the March
01 meeting of the COCIS was “setting up an acceptable monitoring team to
monitor ceasefire mechanism on the ground.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for
peace with MILF.
Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

5. FPPF - In para 3 it states, “The Government invokes its right for the
MILF to fully observe the May 6, 2002 joint communiqué where the MILF agreed to
interdict criminal elements taking refuge in their remaining controlled areas…”

 Finding - One of the talking points during the
March 01 meeting of the COCIS was “for both sides to observe their May 6, 2002
joint communiqué where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements taking
refuge in their controlled areas.” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with
MILF.
Donna Pazzibugan. Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

6.  FPPF - In para 3 it states, “the LGU’s of
Cotabato province and Pikit can now start implementing the Special Economic
Enhancement and Development Program for Pikit (Seed Pikit)
.”

 Finding  - On Feb 26, GMA, in a NAPC meeting in
Malacañang, said: “North Cotabato Governor Emmanuel Piñol has already drawn a
development program for Pikit. I already released P5 million from the National Government to assist in the
development plan.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

7.  FPPF - In para 3 it states, “the
Government through the National Development Co. will be in a better position to
fully implement the US $100 million joint venture Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur
palm oil and sugarcane plantations confidential deal being hammered out by the
President as a promissory concession once the two countries agreed to meddle in
a peace talk with the MILF
.”

 Findings - On Feb 19, GMA, in a luncheon meeting
with members of the Malacañang Press Corps said: “The establishment of a palm
oil plantation in Buliok is in order, to be bankrolled by the Khaddafi
Foundation. They have been looking for a consolidated area. The foundation’s
local partner is the National Development Corporation. Very soon, an investment
decision might be concluded.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 - The Buliok offensive was implemented to prepare the
Liguasan Marsh for the Libyan Palm Oil Plantation Project. GMA allegedly had a
personal interest in the $100-million worth project. It was proposed to her by
Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns Norberto Gonzales in 2001 upon her
assumption to power. The joint Libyan-Malaysian deal involved the Al Ghaddafi
Foundation headed by the Libyan leader’s son, Sayf Al Islam. (GMA under fire
for Libya Palm Oil Deal.
Philippine Headline News Online. 05 March 03)

 - On Feb 26, GMA, in a NAPC meeting in Malacañang said:
“Part of the development fund will be used for planting corn and part of it
will be for planting palm oil. Malaysia, after my talks with Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamed in my last visit to Kuala Lumpur, will be providing the
planting materials for palm oil.” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 - On March 28, both GRP and MILF peace panels agreed to
involve Libya in the Peace Talks. (Gov’t, MILF agree to resume peace talks.
PDI. 31 Mar 03)

 - On March 26, GMA said: “I am confident that Malaysia’s
support as third party facilitator in the peace talks between the Philippine
Government and the MILF will succeed.” (PND News Release, 26 Mar 03)

8. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “the MILF must be held responsible for the
AFP-backed spate of bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor
transmission towers, power sub-stations and barges…”

 Findings - One of the talking points during the
March 01 meeting of the COCIS was “pinpointing responsibility for the spate of
bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission
towers…” (Gov’t unveils 4-pt plan for peace with MILF. Donna Pazzibugan.
Inquirer News Service. 02 Mar 03)

 - On Feb 15, two Napocor transmission towers in Carmen and
Pikit towns were bombed. The MILF was blamed by the AFP for the incident but
MILF spokesperson Eid Kabalu denied MILF involvement. (2 more Napocor
transmission towers bombed
. Froilan Gallardo. Mindanews. 15 Feb 03)

 - On Feb 26, seven Napocor transmission towers were bombed.
(Power outages loom after Mindanao blackout. sunstar.com. 28 Feb 03)

 - On Feb 27, AFP Southern Command Spokesman Lt. Col Daniel
Lucero said: “The MILF has earlier threatened to attack power stations and
steel towers, and we are blaming them for these attacks.” (MILF sabotage
blamed for Mindanao blackout.
Edith Regalado, Roel Pareño, et.al. Philippine
Star. 28 Feb 03.). But Eid Kabalu denied involvement of the MILF in those
bombings. (Power outages loom after Mindanao blackout. sunstar.com. 28
Feb 03)

9. FPPF - In para 4 it states, “Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition,
multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder will be filed against MILF
leaders in various courts in order to secure warrants of arrest against them
and reduce them in estoppel.”

 Finding - On March 07, multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder charges were filed against MILF leaders Salamat
Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, Ghazali Jaafar and Eid Kabalu in connection with
the Davao Airport bombings. (Gov’t files bombing charges vs MILF head, 148
others.
Inquirer News Service. 07 Mar 03)

10.
FPPF - In para 4 it states, “The
AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over print and broadcast
media, and destabilizations in urban Christian areas, such as Davao
International Airport, Awang Airport, Gen Santos City International Standard
Airport, Zamboanga International Airport, Cagayan de Oro Airport, principal
ports and wharves, foreign embassies and consulates, hotels and restaurants,
shopping malls, hospitals, churches, public markets and terminals, radio and
television stations, factories, oil depots and gasoline stations, buses,
cinemas, schools, plazas and others must be intensified and thereafter put the
blame on the MILF…”

 Findings - On Feb 20, a car bomb exploded at the
Awang Airport killing one person and injuring six others. While another bomb
exploded at a public market in Kabacan, Cotabato killing one person and
injuring ten others. The AFP put blame on the MILF as Lt. Col. Michael
Manquiquis said: “One of the possibilities that we could consider is that it
could be the MILF.” MILF Spokesman Eid Kabalu denied the charges. (16 dead
as fresh violence sweeps Mindanao.
Agence France-Presse. 20 Feb 03)

 - On Feb 21, car bombs exploded simultaneously outside a
shopping mall in Koronadal, South Cotabato. (3 hurt in bomb blast at South
Cotabato mall.
Inq7.net with Agence France-Presse. 21 Feb 03.

 - On March 04, a bomb exploded at the arrival area of the
Davao International Airport killing 19 persons. Minutes later, another bomb
exploded inside a health office in nearby Tagum City, Davao, which left two
people injured. (19 killed in Davao Blasts. Philippine Star. 05 Mar 03).
The AFP points the blame to the MILF despite admissions by the Abu Sayyaf
Group. (Malacañang, police junk Abu claim on Davao blast. Inq7.net. 05
Mar 03). The next day March 05, the MILF issued a statement condemning the
Davao Airport bombing. (see Annex D)

 * In an article of the Philippine Graphic, Datu Lacs Dalidig
of the Muslim Multisectoral Movement for Peace and Development claimed that GMA
admitted to him that the MILF was not responsible for the Davao Airport
bombing. This admission, according to Dalidig, was made in the presence of
former Exec. Sec. Renato de Villa, Sec. Norberto Gonzales, DSWD Sec. Corazon
Soliman, and NAPC Sec. Ging Deles. The Graphic also got in touch with Sec. Gonzales
during the Oakwood Incident and he admitted, “there were leads that indicated the MILF did not do it.” (GMA
acknowledged Davao blast was work of ‘3rd Force’.
Inday
Espina-Varona. Graphic Special Issue Vol. 14 No. 9. 28 July 03)

 - On April 02, a bomb exploded through a row of crowded food
stalls outside the Sasa Wharf killing 16 persons and injuring 55 others. (Sasa
port blast suspect arrested
. Rex C. Otero. Sunstar.com. 05 Apr 03)

 * Then ISAFP chief Gen. Victor Corpuz was seen in the
morning of April 02 in Davao city by a key witness of the protesting soldiers
in Oakwood. His presence in Davao city on the same day of the Sasa wharf
bombing could only mean two things according to the protesting soldiers, either
he was there to personally supervise a major “special operation”, or he was so
incompetent that as head of the AFP’s Intelligence Service he never had a clue
that a major terrorist activity was about to take place under his very nose.

 - On April 03, three Davao City Mosques were bombed. (3
Davao Mosques Bombed.
Philippine Star. 04 Apr 03)

 - On May 10, a bomb (made out of 81 mm mortar cartridge)
exploded in front of a public market in Koronadal, South Cotabato. (Over a
dozen dead in bomb blast in S. Mindanao
. Agence France-Presse, 10 May 03)

 -  On July 10, a bomb exploded at a
crowded market in Koronadal, South Cotabato killing at least 6 people and
injuring 20 others. (AFP: 6 killed, 20 hurt in Koronadal blast.
Reuters/abs-cbnNEWS.com. 10 July 03)

11.
FPPF  -  In para 4 it states, “…thereafter put the blame on the
MILF so as to convince that Asean, the European Union, and the United States’
State Department to formally declare the MILF as a FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION
…”

 Findings - On April 22, GMA, in a speech in the
University of Mindanao, Davao City, said: “The confession of captured Abu
Sayyaf member Noor Muhammad Umug establishing the link of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) to the arrested bombing suspects has strengthened
evidence against the MILF as a terrorist group. (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 - On May 11, the Department of National Defense pushed for
the inclusion of the MILF in the United States’ terror list. (DND eyes
terror tag on MILF
. Philippine Star. 12 May 03)

  - On May 13, Sec.
Bunye, in a press briefing, said: “there is a possibility of foreclosing the
(Government-MILF) peace talks, if the MILF is eventually declared as a
terrorist organization…” (Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 - On May 13, GMA said: “The government is nearing a decision
point on whether to declare the MILF a terrorist organization, and to take the
necessary operational and diplomatic measures to strengthen this prospective
policy.” (President: MILF has until June 1 to cut terror links. Jose
Guinto. Inq7.net with Agence France-Presse. 13 May 03)

12.
FPPF  - In para 4 it states “…the MILF’s designation as an FTO
will ensure the smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao
…”

 Findings - The Balikatan 03-1 was originally
slated in Sulu. (Sec. Bunye in a statement, PND News Release. 17 Feb 03). But
on March 04, Sec. Bunye said: “We are not married to the idea of holding the
Balikatan 03-1 in Sulu. The search is for other possible venues for Balikatan 03-1…”
(PND News Release. 04 Mar 03)

 - On March 12, GMA said: “I would not mind holding the
Balikatan exercises in North Cotabato.” (PND News Release. 12 Mar 03)

 - On March 17, GMA, in a radio interview, said: “It was the
local government of (North) Cotabato, under Governor Emmanuel Piñol, that
volunteered and asked that the Balikatan be conducted in their area.”
(Downloaded from www.op.gov.ph)

 

 

 

On
the Objectives of OPLAN GREENBASE

 

 Based
on the two documents, the objectives of OPLAN GREENBASE have been deduced to
the following:

 

1. To
capture and occupy Buliok Complex and environs within one week.

2. To
clear the Liguasan Marsh Area so that development projects can be implemented
as concessions to the Libyan and Malaysian participation in the GRP-MILF peace
talks.

3. To
capture MILF Chair Salamat Hashim dead or alive.

4. To
file criminal charges against MILF leaders.

5. To
bomb Napocor transmission towers and power sub-stations, and blame the MILF.

6. To
conduct comprehensive psywar operations and destabilizations in Urban Christian
Areas and blame the MILF.

7. To
convince the Asean, the European Union, and the United States to declare the
MILF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (because of the terrorist activities
to be blamed on them as stated in 5 and 6 above)

8. To
transfer the venue for the conduct of the Balikatan 03-1 to Central Mindanao.

9. To
resume formal Peace Talks once the objectives were achieved.

 

 Findings - Based on the data gathered,
objectives 1 to 6 were achieved. Objectives 7 and 8, while they have yet to be
achieved, were attempted to by GMA and her officials to dangle as leverages or
threats against the MILF. These were apparently grave enough to have the MILF
capitulate and call for a 10-day unilateral ceasefire on June 02. (MILF
declares 10-day unilateral ceasefire.
Joel Guinto. inq7.net. 28 May 03)

 As for
Objective 9, both the GRP and MILF have declared a mutual ceasefire and the
negotiations for the resumption of peace talks are now underway. (Philippine
Government, MILF work out for renewed ceasefire.
20 July 03. downloaded
from www.luwaran.com)

 

ANALYSIS

 

In view of the above findings, the
Greenbase Documents are not spurious as their contents were based on either
true information or actual events. At the same time, almost all the objectives
set forth in OPLAN GREENBASE were found to have been directly or indirectly
achieved. Therefore, the documents could not have been propaganda materials.

Still, the findings above are not enough
to conclude that the documents or more specifically OPLAN GREENBASE is an
action plan. The element needed to conclude it as such, is the time the
documents were made. If the documents were made prior to the occurrence of
events or the official pronouncements, then OPLAN GREENBASE is, indeed, an
action plan. Otherwise, if the documents were made after, then it merely
becomes a white paper.

To this, a reference would be made on the
date when Sec. Bunye made a statement that the Greenbase Document is spurious
and that is—27 February 2003 (see Bunye’s full statement in page 6 above). This
statement placed the time the documents were made at not later than the said
date. On the assumption that it took at least two weeks before Sec. Bunye was
able to get hold of a leaked copy, then it placed the time it was made at about
the same date indicated in the document, which is 11 February 2003. At that
point in time, no one except those in the upper echelons of power could have
had access to all the technical and classified information contained in the
Greenbase Documents. Neither could anyone have accurately predicted the actions
and pronouncements of the government nor the future events.

It is clear, therefore, that the contents
of the Greenbase Documents are true and that OPLAN GREENBASE is a secret action
plan authorized by GMA and executed by the DND, OPAPP and other government
agencies.

 

CONCLUSION

 

With the revelation that the Greenbase
Documents are true, comes a very frightening implication – that GMA and her
administration can and will sacrifice the lives of innocent people she had
sworn to serve and protect, in the pursuit of political, economic and personal
interests.

The comprehensive peace policy of her
Administration had been very promising while the signing of the Agreement on
the Cessation of Hostilities had been hoped by many as the first step to
lasting peace in Mindanao that all Filipinos longed for. But just like how she
reneged on her Dec 30 vow not to run for President in 2004 and how she reneged
on the Oakwood Agreements, she—full of deceit and betrayal—also reneged on this
very sacred agreement and ordered an all-out war to the unsuspecting MILF
secessionists. The difference from the first two however is that, in the
latter, hundreds of people died or were wounded—civilians, soldiers, and rebels
alike; hundreds of thousands of families were displaced with the children left
forever traumatized and deprived of education that would eventually force them
to join the next generation of rebels; and billions were lost in damaged
property and on relief and rehabilitation costs. All these enormous costs for a
war that never should have been.

Finally, the Greenbase Documents validate
the fear that state-sponsored terrorism had become a policy option in the GMA
Administration. The Davao bombings and other bombings in Mindanao, which left
hundreds of innocent civilians dead, are mass murders and works of evil minds
and heartless individuals. At the very least, these horrible incidents
shattered all the pretensions of democracy under the GMA Administration and
effectively removed its very reason for existence.

ANNEX A

 

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 3

DEFINING POLICY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE
FOR GOVERNMENT’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE EFFORTS

 

 WHEREAS,
a primary objective of the government is the attainment of a just,
comprehensive and enduring peace under the rule of law and in accordance with
constitutional processes, which is the basic foundation for sustainable
economic and human development and national prosperity;

 WHEREAS, a just comprehensive
and enduring peace requires not merely the end of internal armed conflicts, but
just as importantly the resolution of root causes of the armed conflicts and
social unrest, transformation of Philippine society to one characterized by
justice, equity, tolerance, harmonious pluralism, and full respect for human
rights;

 WHEREAS, the nationwide public
consultations of the National Unification Commission recommended a
comprehensive, integrated and holistic peace process comprising “Three
Principles and Six Paths to Peace” as necessary for the attainment of a just
and enduring peace;

 WHEREAS, this comprehensive,
integrated and holistic peace process was adopted as government policy under
Executive Order No. 125, s. 1993, which created the Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process;

 WHEREAS, there is a desire to
reaffirm the government’s continuing commitment to this comprehensive peace
process and to consolidate its gains;

          
WHEREAS, in line with the Administration’s policy to reconstruct
the peace process, there is a need to strengthen and streamline processes and
rationalize structures towards an effective and integrated approach to the
pursuit of peace, responsive to the changing situation of conflict in the
country and lessons learned from the past implementation;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further enhance the
contribution of civil society to comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people’s participation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do
hereby order;

Section 1. Scope. The government’s policy framework for peace, including the
systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the
comprehensive peace process, shall be governed by this Executive Order.

Section 2. The Systematic Approach to Peace. The government shall continue to pursue a comprehensive,
integrated and holistic approach to peace that is guided by the principles and
processes laid down in this Executive Order. These shall provide the framework for the implementation, coordination,
monitoring and integration of all government peace initiatives, and guide its
partnership with civil society in the pursuit of a just and enduring peace.

Section 3. The Three Principles of the Comprehensive Peace Process. The comprehensive peace
process shall continue to be governed by the following underlying principles:

a.   A
comprehensive peace process should be community-based, reflecting the
sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipino. Thus, it shall be
defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups
only, but by all Filipinos as one community.

          
b.   A comprehensive peace process aims to forge a new social compact
for a just, equitable, humane and pluralistic society. It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic
society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful
competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through
the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and where
they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free,
fair and honest.

          
c.   A comprehensive peace process seeks a principled and peaceful
resolution to the internal armed conflicts, with neither blame nor surrender,
but with dignity for all concerned.

          
Section 4. The Six Paths to
Peace. 
The components of the
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the “Paths to
Peace”. These component processes are
interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited
to, the following:

a.   PURSUIT
OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS.
 This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies,
reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
armed conflicts and social unrest. This
may require administrative action, new legislation, or even constitutional
amendments.

b.   CONSENSUS-BUILDING
AND EMPOWERMENT FOR PEACE.
This component includes continuing consultations
on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and
process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the
peace process.

c.    PEACEFUL,
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH THE DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS.
This component involves the conduct of
face-to-face negotiations to reach peaceful settlement with the different rebel
groups. It also involves the effective implementation of peace agreements.

d.   Program
for reconciliation, reintegration into mainstream society and rehabilitation.

This component includes programs to address the legal status and security of
former rebels, as well as community-based assistance programs to address the
economic, social and psychological rehabilitation needs of former rebels,
demobilized combatants and civilian victims of the internal armed conflict.

e.   ADDRESSING
CONCERNS ARISING FORM CONTINUING ARMED HOSTILITIES.
 This component involves the strict
implementation of laws and policy guidelines, and the institution of programs
to ensure the protection of non-combatants and reduce the impact of the armed
conflict on communities found in conflict areas.

f.    BUILDING
AND NURTURING A CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO PEACE.
 This component includes peace advocacy and peace education programs, and
the implementation of various confidence- building measures.

Section 5. Administrative Structure. The administrative
Structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process shall be as follows:

a.  THE
PRESIDENCY.
 The President shall
exercise active and focused leadership that is essential for the effective
pursuit of the comprehensive peace process.

 b. PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS. 
The
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) shall be charged with the
management and supervision of the comprehensive peace process. The PAPP shall be appointed by the President
and shall have the rank and remuneration of a Cabinet Member. He shall
have the authority to coordinate and integrate, in behalf of the President, all
existing peace efforts. As such, the
PAPP shall have direct supervision and control over the specific structures and
programs designed for the implementation of the comprehensive peace
process. He shall have the following
functions and responsibilities:

1) Advise and assist the President in the
management, direction and supervision of the comprehensive peace process;

2) Recommend to the President policies, programs
and actions to implement the
comprehensive peace process;

3)  Report to
the President on the progress of implementation of the comprehensive peace process;

4)  Supervise
the government agencies and instrumentalities, to include their program
and activities, purposely created for the implementation of various
components of the comprehensive peace process, such as the Government Peace
Negotiating Panels and the National Program for Unification and Development;

5)  Coordinate with the other government agencies
involved in the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, including
the National Amnesty Commission and the National Anti-Poverty Commission, as
well as the various departments and instrumentalities which should participate
or provide support to the overall effort;

6)  Conduct regular dialogues with the National
Peace Forum and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments and
recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process.

7)   Perform such other functions as directed by the
President.

c. GOVERNMENT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANELS.   
There shall be established
Government Peace Negotiating Panels (GPNPs) for negotiations with different
rebel groups,  to be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who shall
be appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct
negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups. They
shall report to the President, through the PAPP, on the conduct and progress of
their negotiations.

    
The GPNPs shall each be provided technical support by a Panel Secretariat under
the direct control and supervision of the respective Panel Chairmen. They shall
be authorized to hire consultants and to organize their own Technical
Committees to assist in the technical requirements for the negotiations.
Upon conclusion of a final peace agreement with any of the rebel groups, the
concerned GPNP shall be dissolved. Its Panel Secretariat shall be retained in
the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) for the
purpose of providing support for the monitoring of the implementation of the peace
agreement.

d.  PANEL
OF ADVISERS.
   There shall be Panel of Advisers for each of the
GPNPs, composed of representatives from the Senate, House of Representatives,
members of the Cabinet and representatives of civil society and other advisers
as may be designated by the President upon recommendation of the PAPP, which
shall function as an advisory body to their respective GPNPs on the conduct of
their negotiations.

            
Section 6. National Program for Unification and Development Council.
The National Program for
Unification and Development Council
(NPUDC) shall be charged with the implementation of programs for the
reconciliation and reintegration into mainstream society of former rebels,
through area-based projects and activities to address their economic, social
and psychological rehabilitation needs.

            
Section 7. The National Amnesty Commission.  The National
Amnesty Commission (NAC) shall take charge of the government’s amnesty program
to address the legal status and security of former combatants. The PAPP shall
be in active coordination with the NAC in ensuring the appropriate response of
government to the needs of former combatants.

            
Section 8. The National Peace Forum. To crystallize the
partnership between the government and civil society in the pursuit of a just
and enduring peace, there shall be a National Peace Forum (NPF) which shall
function as an advisory body to the PAPP. It shall be the principal forum for
the PAPP to consult with and seek advise from the peace advocates, peace
partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on
the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government-civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives.

            
Section 9. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) shall
provide technical and administrative support to the PAPP in the discharge of
his functions for the coordination and implementation of all components of the
comprehensive peace process.

            
The secretariat of the National Peace Forum (NPF) established under EO 115, s.
1999 shall be integrated into and function as a component unit of the OPAPP.

            
Administrative support services for the GPNP’s shall be provided by the OPAPP.

            
Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. Subject to the
approval of the Office of the President, the PAPP shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this
Executive Order.

            
Section 11. Funding. The approved budgets of the OPAPP,
the National Program for Unification and Development Council and the National
Peace Forum for the current year shall be the source of funds for the
implementation of the comprehensive peace process for the year 2001.
Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the
OPAPP and other agencies concerned.

            
Section 12. Repealing Clause.
All Executive Orders, rules and regulations and
other issuances, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

            
Section 13. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect
immediately.

            
DONE in the City of Manila, this 28th day of February in the year of
our Lord, Two Thousand One.

   

By the President:

RENATO S. DE VILLA

Executive Secretary

 


ANNEX B

MALACAÑANG
MANILA


February 11, 2003

MEMORANDUM OF
INSTRUCTIONS


TO :  THE SECRETARY
        Department of National Defense
        Camp Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo
        QUEZON CITY


This Memorandum prescribes the Constitutional obligation of the Government to
preserve its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to prevent the
Southern Philippines Secessionists (SPS), particularly the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), from dismembering the Republic.

As President of
the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), I do hereby order the following:

1. Effective 121400H
FEB 2003, I order that the OPLAN
GREENBASE must be totally implemented without prejudice to the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace. The GRP-MILF Agreement on the General Cessation of
Hostilities is hereby suspended indefinitely. The formal talks with the MILF
may resume provided the objective of OPLAN GREENBASE is completely accomplished
in order that the Government can impose its will upon the MILF to accept
“Enhanced Autonomy” or face total pacification in the hands of the AFP.

2. The AFP must
CAPTURE AND OCCUPY
simultaneously within one week the Buliok Complex fronting the
Liguasan Marsh area comprising: (a) Kabasalan Island Complex, (b) Rajamuda
Complex, and (c) Buliok Complex where Salamat Hashim’s headquarteres “Islamic
Center” is located. To achieve this objective, the entire forces and war assets
of Southern Command with the air support of the Philippine Air Force must be
fully utilized.

The Buliok
Complex has been identified by the SouthCom as the base of operations and
refuge area of the notorious Pentagon kidnap-for-ransom group and other heavily
armed criminal groups in Mindanao.
Once the objective of the plan is achieved, the AFP must clear the Liguasan
Marsh of all MILF structures – military, political and social – and lawless
elements, and relocate the civilians living in the marsh.

3. I have
instructed the Department of Energy Secretary to revive the Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract (Cotabato Basin Exploration Project) between Petronas
Carigali Sdn Bhd and the Philippine National Oil Corporation Exploration
Corporation as the draft Farm-in Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement
between the PNOC and Petronas are ready for signing. The joint exploration of
the oil fields of marsh will ensure national economic recovery in anticipation
of peso devaluation against the US dollar, and the oil price increase in the
world market resulting from the impending US-Iraq war. Proper coordination with
the Energy Department is vital to the success of the exploration.

4. I have further ordered the NEDA Director-General to implement the
much-delayed 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan and to
reconstitute the Liguasan Marsh Development Task Force as soon as the AFP takes
full control of the marsh from the MILF.

5. Serve the warrants of arrest issued against Samier Hashim, Ustaz Salamat
Hashim, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and Eid Kabalu by various Courts two years ago.
The AFP must bear in mind that the HIGH-VALUE
TARGET of the plan is TO CAPTURE
SALAMAT HASHIM DEAD OR ALIVE.
The neutralization of Tahir Alonto will only be effected after the MILF leaders
above-mentioned are arrested, jailed or killed.

6. In implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE, the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), and the
National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) must ensure that all evacuees in
the war-affected barangays of Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
provinces are orderly evacuated to different schools or government center in
the nearest town poblacions. The Office of the President – Mindanao and the 6th
Infantry (K) Division, Philippine Army shall strictly supervise the
implementation of the Special Economic
Enhancement and Development Program for Pikit as well as the relief and
rehabilitation of the affected civilians and ensure that their needs are
well-attended to prevent the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the
United Nations agencies, such as Decolonization Commission, UN High Commission
for Refugees, UN Human Rights Commission, International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Society from deeply looking into the present
war against the MILF and the Moros.

7. It is desired that all matters pertinent hereto shall be fully coordinated
with the Presidential Adviser for the Peace Process and the Presidential
Adviser for Special Concerns.

Copy furnished:
OPAPP

 

Sgd

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

*Author’s note: This document was
re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and
include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would
require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email.
However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed
to you.


ANNEX C

                 
 

REPUBLIC
  OF THE PHILIPPINES

 
Office of the President
 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE
  PEACE PROCESS

 

THE PRESIDENT’S
  FOUR-POINT

 
POLICY FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING THE
 
SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES SECESSIONISTS/MILF
  PROBLEM

 
(Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of
  Instructions

 
Approved on 11 February 2003)

 

 

 

 

1. The Government’s high-value target in the implementation of OPLAN GREENBASE is to CAPTURE MILF CHAIRMAN HASHIM
  SALAMAT DEAD OR ALIVE
. To this effect, the AFP must CAPTURE AND OCCUPY Buliok
  Complex
and environs within a week of continuous, massive aerial
  and infantry attacks to permanently deprive the MILF and its leadership of
  setting up future guerilla bases in the marsh and elsewhere in Mindanao.

 

 

 

 
   
   

   

 

   

With the capture of all MILF camps, the
    Government, with the active participation of the local government units in
    the area, must establish an Area of Temporary Stay (
ATS) where the MILF
    rebels and their surviving leaders can be concentrated to avoid
    “mis-encounters” while negotiations for their total capitulation are going
    on. Member-countries of the OIC Committee of Eight may be allowed to visit
    members of the MILF peace panel in an ATS provided officials designated by
    the National Security Council and/or the Cabinet Oversight Committee on
    Internal Security are privy to every minute details of their talks. No
    private or closed-door conversations shall be allowed during the visit.

   

Accordingly, the Government shall assert and uphold its
    authority and solemn duty under the Constitution - preserve our territorial
    integrity as one nation, maintain law and order, and protect the civilian
    population through effective military and police actions against terrorism
    and other forms of lawless violence perpetrated y the MILF and other rebel
    groups to which it has established alliance, i.e. CPP-NPA-NDF, MNLF-Misuari
    Renegade Group, MNLF Executive Council of 15, and MNLF-Alvarez Isnaji Wing.
    This will ensure the Government’s authority to correct past mistakes done
    by the GRP peace panels in every agreement reached with the MILF. Under
    this disadvantageous situation, the MILF can now freely accept the
    Government-offered "Enhanced Autonomy" while garrisoned in their
    ATS.

   

 

 

 

 

 

2. Without prejudice to the GRP-MILF Tripoli
  Agreement of Peace of 2001, the Government has indefinitely suspended the
  Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. To this end, the Government
  will set up an acceptable monitoring team composed of PNP and AFP officials
  to monitor effectively any cease-fire mechanism that could be devised by the
  Defense Department. The duties and functions of an OIC Monitoring Team that
  should have been composed under the existing agreement are hereby vested to
  this Government-sponsored monitoring team.

 

3.
  The Government invokes its right for the MILF to fully observe the May 6,
  2002 joint communique where the MILF agreed to interdict criminal elements
  taking refuge in their remaining controlled areas, particularly the
  petroleum-rich Liguasan Marsh where Hashim Salamat’s P7.5 million worth
  “Islamic Center Mansion” is situated.

 

Once
  the MILF is driven away from the marsh, NEDA can now take off after a few
  years of a halt to the 25-year Liguasan Marsh Development Framework Plan. The
  draft Farm-In Agreement and Joint Operating Agreement between PNOC-EC and
  Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd can now be assigned in due time for the exploration
  of the Marsh’s huge oil deposits. Likewise the LGUs of Cotabato province and
  Pikit can now start implemenitnfg the Special Economic Ehancenment and
  Development Program for Pikit (Seed Pikit).

 


  Following the projected defeat of MILF in the Liguasan war, the Government
  through the National Development Co. will be in a better position to fully
  implement the US$ 100 million joint venture Manila-Tripoli-Kuala Lumpur palm
  oil and sugarcane plantations confidential deal being hammered out by the
  President as a promissory concession once the two countries agreed to
  actively meddle in a peace talk with the MILF. It will be pushed through
  without prejudice to any unlikely diplomatic reaction of Washington since
  both countries antagonize the US Government due to its war mongering against
  Iraq and Libya.

 

4. The MILF must be held responsible for the AFP-backed spate of
  bombings in urban areas and destruction of several Napocor transmission
  towers, power sub-station and barges, the Mt. Apo Geothermal Power Plant, the
  Pulangi Power Plant and power plants of electric cooperatives and companies
  in Mindanao. Appropriate charges of rebellion, sedition, multiple murder and
  multiple frustrated murder will be filed against MILF leaders in various courts
  in order to secure warrants of arrest against them and reduce them in
  estoppel.

 

 

 

 
   
   

   

 

   

The AFP’s plan to conduct comprehensive psywar operations over
    print and broadcast media, and destabilization in urban Christian areas,
    such as Davao International Airport, Awang Airport, Gen, Santos City
    International Standard Airport, Zamboanga International, Cagayan de Oro
    Airport, principal ports and wharves, foreign embassies and consulates,
    hotels and restaurants, shopping malls, hospitals, churches, public markets
    and terminals, radio and television stations, factories, oil depots and
    gasoline stations, busses, cinemas, schools, plazas and then must be
    intensified and thereafter put the blame on the MILF so as to convince the
    Asean, the European Union, and the United States’ State Department to
    formally declare the MILF as a
FOREIGN
    TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
, and Chairman
    Hashim Salamat as a
Specially Designated
    Global Terrorist
 because of the
    gravity and magnitude of threat he and the MILF pose on the national
    security and territorial integrity of the Philippines and Asean countries.
    Hashim’s’capture or death, and MILF’s designation as an FTO will ensure the
    smooth conduct of Balikatan 03-1 in Central Mindanao and the US troops’
    planned basing in Sarangani-Gen. Santos City.

   

Sgd:

   

Eduardo Ermita
   
    /30

   

 

 

 

*Author’s note: This document was
re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and
include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would
require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email.
However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed
to you.


 

     
 

annex D

 

MILF PRESS RELEASE
 
March 5, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

MILF
  STRONGLY CONDEMNS LATEST BOMB BLASTS AT THE

 
DAVAO CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON MARCH 4,
  2003 AT 5:30 PM, LEAVING MANY CASUALTIES, AT LEAST 18 PERSONS DEAD AND 98
  WOUNDED, AND DAMAGES TO PROPERTIES AT THE AIRPORT.

 


  THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF), PARTICULARLY
  BROTHER SALAMAT HASHIM, CHAIRMAN OF THE MILF CENTRAL COMMITTEE, STRONGLY
  CONDEMNS THE LATEST BOMB BLASTS AT THE DAVAO CITY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THAT
  OCCURRED TODAY, MARCH 4, 2003 AT 5:30 P.M., WHICH LEFT AT LEAST 18 DEAD AND
  98 WOUNDED, INCLUDING THE SUBSEQUENT BOMB BLASTS IN TAGUM CITY WHICH ALSO
  VICTIMIZED CIVILIANS.

 

THE
  MILF BELIEVES THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE HORRIBLE AND DASTARDLY ACT
  HAVE NO SENSE OF CARE ON, OR DO NOT VALUE HUMAN LIVES, EVEN AS THEY COMMITTED
  THIS BARBARIC AND COWARD ACT IRREGARDLESS OF THE PLACE THEY CHOSE TO COMMIT
  THE CRIME. MANY PEOPLE WERE THEN AT THE WAITING SHADE OF THE AIRPORT TERMINAL
  BUILDING WAITING FOR THE PLANE PASSENGERS WHO JUST ARRIVED.

 

MEANWHILE,
  THE MILF HEREBY SUGGESTS TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT THAT THESE INCIDENTS
  MUST BE IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATED AND NO STONE TO BE LEFT UNTURNED UNTIL THE
  PERPETRATORS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE TO ANSWER FOR THE HEINOUS CRIME THEY HAVE
  COMMITTED AGAINST HUMANITY. THE MILF, AS ITS DUTY IN ISLAM, IS WILLING TO
  ASSIST THE INVESTIGATION OF THESE TWO BOMBING INCIDENTS BY THE AUTHORITIES.

 

BE
  IT REMEMBERED THAT A SIMILAR BOMB ATTACH ALSO TOOK PLACE AT THE AWANG AIRPORT
  IN DATU ODIN SINSUAT, MAGUINDANAO LAST FEBRUARY 20, 2002, WHICH RAZED TO THE
  GROUND SEVERAL BUILDINGS, AND ALSO LEFT MANY CASUALTIES. THE INCIDENT WAS
  READILY ADMITTED BY THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP THOUGH.

 

APPROVED
  FOR RELEASE
  (March 4, 2003)

 


  AL HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM
  Vice Chairman

 

 

*Author’s note: This document was
re-typed so that its full text could be viewed as reference since to scan and
include the actual photocopied Greenbase documents in this MS Word file would
require more space and would be more difficult to spread through email.
However, should you want to view the photocopied document, it could be emailed
to you.